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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES C. ENGLERT and JO ANN 
ENGLERT, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
HENRY E. ZANE and DOROTHY G. ZANE 
husband and wife, and JOHN A. 
McNEIL and KATHY McNEIL, husband 
and wife, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 910490 
Category No. 16 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3) Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
amended). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal arises from a judgment entered by the 
Honorable J. Philip Eves, District Judge, sitting in the Fifth 
Judicial District Court in Washington County, where Appellants 
sought removal of Respondents1 buildings and user alleged to 
encroach on Appellants' property. The trial judge, however, found 
that Respondents Zane had met the doctrines of both boundary by 
acquiescence and profit a prendre, appropriately vesting title in 
them. Limiting that doctrinefs application, however, the trial 
fashioned a legal remedy for Appellants, as to the encroachment of 
1 
Respondents McNeil, and entered judgment for Appellants in the sum 
of $3,666.41. See Appendix III. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Respondents believe that the following issues constitute 
the appropriate scope of judicial review in the instant case: 
I. Appropriate standards of appellate review compel 
affirmation of the trial courts judgment. 
II. The trial court properly applied the doctrine 
of boundary by acquiescence. 
III. The doctrine of profit a prendre was correctly 
applied in the instant case. 
IV. The trial court erred in failing to apply the 
doctrine of adverse possession to both those 
parecels visibly occupied under color of title 
by the Zanes and the McNeils. 
V. The Appellants, on the basis of several 
applicable doctrines, failed to establish 
the necessary prerequisites to mandate removal 
of Repondents* encroachments. 
VI. Point III of Appellants' brief, which 
indicates that the trial court acted 
arbitrarily in structuring its equitable 
remedy for the McNeils to accommodate their 
alleged encroachment, should be summarily 
rej ected. 
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VII. The trial court erred in considering 
Appellants1 resurvey as disturbing the Santa 
Clara River as the north/south boundary 
between Lots 6 and 7 and Lots 12 and 13. 
VIII. The trial court erred in failing to interpret 
and/or reform the nature of the language 
appearing in the reservations. 
IX. The Supreme Court in the instant case may deem 
it appropriate to award Respondents attorney's fees 
for defending this appeal. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Where necessary/ Respondents shall cite to appropriate 
constitutional and statutory provisions within the body of the 
brief and shall quote the same, unless otherwise noted, in their 
entirety. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. PREFACE 
Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows 
Respondents to separately state their case, assuming their 
"dissatisfaction with Appellants1 statement". In the instant case, 
many of Appellants1 allegations not only lack citation to the 
record, but, indeed, are overwhelmingly contrary to the weight of 
the evidence. For example, page 5 of Appellants1 brief 
[hereinafter AB], states as follows: 
Other than as stated, nothing appears in the 
record to show occupation up to a visible line 
marked by physical landmarks and mutual 
acquiescence in that visible line as the boundary 
over a long period of time by adjoining owners. 
While the Santa Clara River is claimed as the 
boundary by acquiescence, there is nothing in the 
record other than the existence of the river that 
would indicate it to be a boundary line, either 
physically on site or in the public records. 
The recitation of facts herein shall overwhelmingly 
substantiate, however, that there was customary occupation up to 
the edge of the Santa Clara River by the parties and their 
predecessors in interest, and that the Santa Clara River was 
accepted as a boundary by them, by County officials, and by 
reputation. Furthermore, Respondent Dorothy Zane's testimony 
clearly indicates customary usage of the area to the river's edge, 
together with that of her predecessors in interest, for well over 
twenty years. 
Of secondary difficulty is Appellants1 implication, that 
they were bona fide third-party purchasers. (AB at 5) It is, at 
best, an interesting argument, but there are no judicial findings 
or conclusions which support this specious proposition. 
Appellants then state that neither party presented any 
viable evidence as to the cost or damage that would be incurred in 
removing any of the encroachments. (AB at 6) Both the McNeils and 
the Zanes, however, testified that removal of their homes would, in 
all likelihood, destroy the same. In contrast thereto, Appellants 
indicated that the portion of land upon which they claimed an 
encroachment had only casual value to them. 
Appellants1 counsel then claims that the trial court 
arbitrarily located the boundaries at the centerline of the Santa 
Clara River. A colloquy between the trial judge and Appellants' 
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counsel, however, supporting such a resolution of the matter will 
be extensively quoted in Respondents1 factual statement. 
Ultimately, Appellants claim that there was no evidence 
taken as to what portion of Plaintiff's real property was necessary 
to accommodate the McNeil encroachment. (AB at 7) McNeils, 
however, testified that the necessary user for any value to their 
property extended to the edge of the Santa Clara River. More 
importantly, however, Appellants proffered through their own 
surveyor an encroachment consisting of a certain specified number 
of square feet which went to the river's edge. This proffer, in 
terms of the square feet of the encroachment, was accepted by 
Respondents. Now, on appeal, Appellants claim for the first time 
that their proffer should be summarily rejected by this Court to 
otherwise whittle down the encroachment. 
Respondents request this Court's indulgence in reviewing 
the following extensive factual statement. Contravening the 
central postulations of Appellants' brief, this statement of facts 
shall be extensively referenced to the trial court record and 
transcript. 
B. FACTS 
1. BROOKSIDE SUMMER ESTATES/ITS CONCEPT AND FORMATION 
In the mid-1960's, Russell and Pat Walter acquired a 
parcel of ground subsequently subdivided as Brookside Summer Homes. 
See Transcript [hereinafter T] at 174-75. Comprised of 
approximately 61 lots, the subdivision is exclusively rural in 
nature, located approximately 2\ to 3 miles northeast of the town 
5 
of Veyo. (T at 159, 183) The Walters' intent was to subdivide the 
land from top to bottom following the course of the Santa Clara 
River with lots on each side. (T at 155, 159, 195, 198) Mr. and 
Mrs. Walter then used a previously prepared draft of Covenants and 
Restrictions for the Brookside Ranch Estates and recorded and 
applied the same to the Brookside Summer Homes, with a handwritten 
notation on the bottom of that document indicating that the 
restrictions also applied to lots "Brookside Summer Estates". See 
D10. Mr. Walter's familiarity with the subdivision is a given, as 
he resided in a home adjoining Brookside from 1965 through 1988. 
(T at 145, 162-63) 
Being rural in nature, no one has constructed fences 
which extend to the river, septic tanks require a 100-foot setback, 
and all construction is subject to the subdivider's approval. (T 
at 255, 283, Dl) 
Mr. and Mrs. Walter retained Jack R. Newville to survey 
the property and prepare a subdivision plat. (T at 162) 
Consistent with the name "Brookside", Mr. Walter specifically 
instructed Mr. Newville to plat the subdivision so that the lots 
running northwesterly to southeasterly would be divided by the 
centerline of the Santa Clara River. (T at 14, 146-47) As a 
consequence of the meandering course of the Santa Clara River, the 
north-south platted line between the lots also meanders. (T at 7, 
PI) Russell Walter testified that Newville physically set boundary 
stakes away from the riverfs edge so that they wouldn't be washed 
away by floodwater. (T at 152) In mid-1965, the Brookside Summer 
6 
Homes Subdivision plat, based on Newville's survey, was approved 
and recorded in the office of the Washington County Recorder. 
(Memorandum Decision [hereinafter MD] at R 190; T at 435) 
The trial court's memorandum decision sets forth the 
former sequence of events as follows: 
Prior to survey, Mr. Walter instructed Mr. 
Newville that he should lay out the subdivision, 
insofar as possible, to make the Santa Clara River, 
which traverses the property, the common boundary 
between the lots on each side. It was Mr. Walter's 
intention and design that the lots on both sides of 
the river have title to the center line of the 
river. After the subdivision map was completed, it 
appeared that Mr. Walter's instructions had been 
followed as there was a meandering border down the 
center of the subdivision which Mr. Walters, and 
everyone else, assumed followed the course of the 
river. The location of the river did not appear on 
the subdivision plat. 
The Appellants' own surveyor, Mr. Whitehead, testified 
that PI had, indeed, been mistakenly platted in that Newville's 
reference to the center section line and his tie from that center 
section line are different than the actual ties that presently 
exist according to official government surveys. (T at 65) 
Comparing PI to the recently reestablished governmental survey, 
Newville's ties were off north and south 48 feet and east and west 
approximately 100 feet. See T at 67-71, 82. Appellants' surveyor 
concluded his testimony by indicating that by reason of Newville's 
mistakes, Pi's center line boundary between Lots 12 and 13 and 
Lots 6 and 7 could not have been the Santa Clara River. See T at 
82-83. PI, the official county plat, did not even depict 
accurately the road that accessed the subdivision. (T at 435) The 
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trial court judge commented on this surveying error, which runs 
throughout the entire subdivision, as follows: 
That leaves begging, of course, the question of 
whether or not if the survey had been done 
correctly, there would be any encroachment at all. 
(T at 72) 
Mr. Walter then proceeded to sell the Brookside lots to 
various buyers. As they were sold . . . 
he informed each buyer whose lot appeared to abut 
the river that they were in fact acquiring title to 
the center line of the river and nothing on the 
other side of the river. This was based on 
Mr. Walter's assumption that his instructions to 
Mr. Newville had been followed. (MD at 191; T at 
152) 
Indeed, Walter testified that he both told and showed each buyer 
that the river was their lot line, displaying Newville's stakes 
approximately fifteen feet from the edge "of the creek". (T at 
152, 163, 438) As to Appellants' Lots 12 and 13, Walter 
specifically testified that they had been laid out bordering the 
Santa Clara River. (T at 201) The trial court also accepted Mr. 
Walter's testimony as follows: 
As Mr. Walter sold the lots in his subdivision to 
various buyers he informed each buyer whose lot 
appeared to abut the river that they were in fact 
acquiring title to the center line of the river and 
nothing on the other side of the river. (MD at 
191; see also T at 198) 
2. DEED RESERVATIONS 
To further bolster the buyer's knowledge of boundaries 
Walter inserted a reservation in all but two deeds issued in the 
Brookside Summer Homes Subdivision. This reservation was to 
guarantee "that even if the course of the river changed the 
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boundary line between the lots would change with it." The language 
of the reservation conveyed the property "less any part crossing 
the Santa Clara River", so that no lot would bridge or cross over 
the river. (MD at 191-92; T at 159-60) Lots 6, 7 and 13, which 
comprised a portion of the lawsuit, all contained this reservation 
in their chain of title. (T at 16) Lot 12 was one of two lots in 
the subdivision from which the reservation was mistakenly omitted. 
Walter testified that he was not going to sell Lot 12 at all, 
because it lacked usable ground for building. Nonetheless, Walter 
finally sold Lot 12 to the original owner of adjoining Lot 13. See 
T at 202. 
Subsection 20 of Rule 803 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
allows receipt of reputation testimony concerning boundaries. In 
the instant case, the trial court clearly found, by a plethora of 
evidence that 
[p]laintiffsf and the defendants1 predecessors in 
interest purchased their lots with the clear 
understanding that the centerline of the river was 
the boundary. The subdivider and the County Tax 
Assessor also have believed that such was the case 
and and [sic] have so represented the situation to 
the property owners. (MD at 198; see also T at 
167, 197-98, 252, 282, 292) 
This legal conclusion is amply supported by the record. Beyond 
reputation and usage, even Blair Mitchell, Appellants' title agent, 
conceded homeowner use in Brookside up to the river's edge. (T at 
43) Appellants' surveyor, Mr. Whitehead testified similarly, as 
did Mr. Arnold, the President of Brookside Homeowners' Association, 
who provided a portion of the testimony as to reputation. 
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3. OCCUPATION AND USE BY DEFENDANTS 
The Zane's predecessors in interest, Chester and Marion 
Karr, purchased Lot 7 and began constructing their home in mid or 
late 1966 or early 1967. (T at 150) The Washington County 
Assessor first noted the home on the tax rolls in May of 1968. (T 
at 113) Mr. Walter sold on contract, and deeds were not recorded 
until they were fully paid off. Thus, home completion regularly 
preceded recordation. (T at 146) Shortly after the Karrs built 
their home, the Myers, who were the McNeil's predecessors in 
interest, placed a mobile home on Lot 6, improving the property as 
the Karrs had, all the way to the river. (T at 153-157) Despite 
Walter's testimony as to when the Myers moved onto the property, 
the Court felt uncertain as to a twenty-year occupation of Lot 6 on 
behalf of the McNeils. In all other respects, however, the trial 
court felt that both the occupation and usage of the Zane's and 
their predecessors in interest for well over twenty years prior to 
the filing of suit, and by the McNeils and their predecessors in 
interest for at least nineteen years prior to the filing suit was 
open, notorious, exclusive, and consistent with the ownership 
rights which would customarily be exercised by lot owners in the 
subdivision. The trial court's language follows: 
In the first year or so after the subdivision 
was recorded, Mr. Walter sold Lot 7 to Mr. and Mrs. 
Karr on a Real Estate Sales Contract. The Karrs 
immediately took possession and began building a 
house on the lot which was completed by the end of 
1967 or the beginning of 1968. In 1969, after the 
real estate contract was paid off, Mr. Walter 
recorded a warranty deed transferring title from 
the Lucky 7 Rodeo Corporation to the Karrs. The 
Karrs were told at the time that they purchased the 
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property that they owned the land up to the center 
of the river and were actually taken to the 
property and shown survey stakes by Mr. Walter 
which he said evidenced that boundary. The Karrs 
purchased the property after receiving those 
representations. Immediately after signing the 
real estate contract the Karrs began using the land 
to the river's edge for various recreational 
pursuits, as a back yard, for access to the river 
and for the maintenance of landscaping such as 
grasses and trees. Some of the plants in the area 
were natural and some imported and planted by the 
Karrs. The area was kept groomed to the water's 
edge. Mr. Walter observed this use and testified 
that it continued for several years after the Karrs 
took possession. 
Within a short time after the Karrs bought 
Lot 7, Mr. and Mrs. Glenn Myers bought Lot 6, also 
on a land sales agreement. They also took 
possession of the property immediately and placed a 
mobile home thereon. The exact date that they 
purchased the property or took possession was not 
established by the evidence but the Karrs and the 
Myers were among the first purchasers in the 
subdivision. Title to Lot 7 was transferred by 
Warranty deed to the Myers in 1972 after they paid 
off their land sales contract. The county tax 
records indicate a mobile home first appeared on 
the property in the 1970 assessment. The Myers 
were also told by Mr. Walter when they purchased 
that their land extended to the center line of the 
river. Sometime after their purchase of the land, 
the Myers began using the property to the water's 
edge much in the same way as the karrs were doing. 
The Court finds by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Lots 6 and 7 were used much in the 
same fashion through various owners thereafter to 
the present title holders, Mr. and Mrs. Zane on 
Lot 7 and Mr. and Mrs. McNeil on Lot 6, the 
testimony of Mr. Santa Maria notwithstanding. The 
Court's onsight [sic] inspection revealed that both 
the Zanes and the McNeils continue to use the land 
in the same ways as did their predecessors. (MD at 
192-94) 
The trial court's recitation is supported at T at 86, 88, 113, 145-
46, 150-51, 153-57, 189-94, 208-10, 212-27, 230-43, 246-49, 271-78, 
285. Clearly, no one ever objected to the "Brookside" user of Lots 
6 and 7, as these lots were believed to adjoin the river. (T at 
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157) Thus, neither George Bennett, who initially purchased Lot 13, 
nor the Wertz1, who subsequently owned both Lots 12 and 13, ever 
disturbed that property which was north and west of the Santa Clara 
River. See Id.; see also T at 222. Even as of the date of trial, 
nothing was developed on the other side of the river from where 
Lots 6 and 7 were believed to be located. (T at 215) 
4. THE ASSESSMENT AND TAXING SYSTEM 
Respondents believe, in this one instance, that the trial 
court failed to accurately assess the testimony of the Washington 
County Assessor's office or the County Treasurer. The trial court 
stated its findings in this rather cursory fashion: 
The Washington County Assessor assumed that 
the river was the boundary between Lots 5, 6 and 7 
on one side and Lots 12 and 13 on the other but the 
taxes were assessed not on the location of the 
river but on the location of the property lines as 
shown on the subdivision plat recorded in the 
County Recorder's Office. The Court finds that no 
taxes for Lots 12 and 13 were ever paid by the 
owners of Lots 6 and 7. . . Both the Plaintiffs and 
the Defendants' predecessors in interest purchased 
their lots with the clear understanding that the 
center line of the river was the boundary. The 
subdivider and the County Tax Assessor also have 
believed that such was the case and have so 
represented the situation to the property owners. 
(MD, T at 194, 198) 
In point of fact, Clint Perkins, the County Assessor, testified 
that the County Assessor's office considered the boundary line 
between Lots 6 and 7, owned by the Respondents, and Lots 12 and 13, 
owned by the Appellants, to be the Santa Clara River. (T at 111) 
The Assessor's office showed that Lots 6 and 7 had improvements on 
them, and those improvements had been assessed solely to those 
lots. (T at 112) Never had any improvements been assessed to Lots 
12 
12 and 13. Id. To the Assessor's knowledge, no ground lying 
northwesterly of the Santa Clara River was ever taxed to Lot 12 or 
13. (T at 113-115) The appraiser working under Mr. Perkins also 
advised him that the Santa Clara River was the dividing line 
between Lots 6 and 7 and 12 and 13. See T at 122, 129-30. In an 
affidavit which is part of the record on appeal, the County 
Treasurer also indicated that all of the improvements had been 
assessed to Lots 6 and 7 and that the Respondents Zane had been 
paying on all of those assessments since 1969, with the McNeils 
beginning in 1971. (R 33-34; see also T at 210) 
Mr. Perkins was subsequently recalled and again indicated 
that procedures used in his office assessed land and improvements 
on lots, which lots virtually appeared to border the Santa Clara 
River. (T at 295) He also indicated that the working plat used by 
the County Treasurer's office has a different location of the river 
from the plat before the Court (PI) , and that in all circumstances, 
all of the improvements have been taxed to Lots 6 and 7. (T at 30, 
299) Indeed, the following interchange was elicited on direct 
examination: 
Q: [By Mr. Hughes] In terms of your assessments, 
have you assessed the property connected with the 
residences to Lots 6 and 7 down to the edge of the 
Santa Clara River. 
A: [By Mr. Perkins] Yes. (T at 301, 7-10) 
Orlow McKuen provided the Court with Defendant's Exhibit 
11, a copy of which is now before the Court because the original 
was multi-colored by Mr. McKuen, with the letters "H" marking the 
location of each home in the subdivision. See T at 306-07, 309. 
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McKuen had drawn a blue line down the center of Brookside Summer 
Homes to represent where the Santa Clara River was located for 
assessment purposes. (T at 308) To McKuen, it was obvious that 
the boundary line was the Santa Clara River. (T at 310) As a 
result, none of the improvements to the north and west of the Santa 
Clara River were ever assessed to Lots 12 or 13. (T at 311) On 
Dll, McKuen had placed the blue line as demarcating the Santa Clara 
River by the jagged nature of that line with many angles showing 
the flow of the river on the subdivision plat. (T at 312) This 
was consistent with Russ Walter's testimony as to how he had 
initially instructed the original surveyor to prepare the plat. 
McKuen further testified that for assessment purposes, Lots 6, 7, 
12 and 13 were all considered as bordering the Santa Clara River. 
(T at 313) McKuen1s phrasing concerning the manner of assessments 
was acutely relevant and material in the instant case: 
[A]ny normal person that looks at it can see thatfs 
were the river is. That's where the boundary line 
is (meaning the river). (T at 319-20; see also T 
at 327) 
Edmund McAllister, who had been employed as an appraiser 
by Washington County for approximately 9\ years at the time of 
trial. (T at 443) He also testified that the assessor's office 
assumed that the Santa Clara River functioned as a boundary to the 
lots on both sides. (T at 446) There is no testimony contrary to 
that of Mr. Perkins, Mr. McKuen and Mr. McAllister. For that 
reason, Respondents, in their recitation of facts herein, must 
argue beyond the conclusions of the trial court. Indeed, 
Respondents believe that they adversely possessed their property 
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which Appellants now claim. Furthermore, the trial court totally 
missed the thrust of Justice Stewart's opinion in Bountiful v. 
Riley. 784 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1989), infra. Point VI. 
5. PLAINTIFF'S RESURVEY/PURCHASE 
Appellants were sophisticated buyers. They obtained an 
offer and acceptance on Lots 12 and 13 of the Brookside Summer Home 
Estates on July 1, 1988, with a closing scheduled on September 8, 
1988. (T at 366) Mr. Englert testified that he had unlimited 
licenses in all the general engineering areas; furthermore, he had 
been involved in buying probably a hundred pieces of land over the 
years. (T at 367, 376) Mrs. Englert testified that she had been 
involved as a real estate agent and broker in Las Vegas since 1977, 
subsequently working for Appellants' underwriter, First American 
Title/ until June 30, 1988. (T at 408) Appellants' purchase was 
specifically conditioned on a survey approved by them. (T at 317, 
387) 
Well in advance of the scheduled closing, Appellants 
retained Mr. Whitehead. (T at 54) The nature of the Whitehead 
survey, prepared on August 1, 1988, its accuracy and limitations 
were clearly testified to by Whitehead. The document itself 
indicates as follows: 
The purpose of this survey was to retrace the 
original survey as performed by Jack R. Newville, 
Utah Certificate No. 2164, and to show the 
relationship to the existing section lines. . . 
(P3) 
Whitehead testified that he had attempted to locate Lots 12 and 13 
where Mr. Newville had originally located the lots but not in their 
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actual location. (T at 65) Additionally, Whitehead made no 
attempt to independently determine the accurate location of Lots 6 
and 7. (T at 69, 73-74) Indeed, Whitehead specifically testified 
that despite substantial errors in the original survey, P3 
purposely attempted to replicate those errors. (T at 71) The 
trial court commented thereon as follows: 
That leaves begging, of course, the question of 
whether or not if the survey had been done 
correctly, there would be any encroachment at all. 
(T at 72) 
Succinctly stated, Whitehead reused Newville's inaccuracies from 
the official government survey in drafting P3. (T at 78) 
Whitehead then conceded the possibility of an overlap existing 
between Lots 6 and 7 and Lots 12 and 13. (T at 80) Furthermore, 
Whitehead testified that if Mr. Newville had been instructed to 
make the boundary between Lots 12 and 13 and Lots 6 and 7 the Santa 
Clara River, the initial survey on which Whitehead had based P3 was 
entirely mistaken on this postulation as well. (T at 82, PI, P3) 
Whitehead advised Appellants that there were possible 
encroachments on Lots 12 and 13 in August of 1988. (T at 84-85) 
Appellants1 title insurance policy also indicates the underwriters 
trepidation. (P2) Schedule B, Section 1, point 4 indicated the 
following exclusion from coverage: 
Discrepancies, conflicts and boundary lines, 
shortage in area, encroachments, or any other facts 
which a correct survey would disclose, and which 
are not shown by public records. (P2, emphasis 
added) 
Section 2 of Schedule B added in points 8 and 9 the following two 
exclusions: 
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8. Any discrepancies in the boundaries and 
dimensions of said land which could be 
determined by an Accurate Resurvey of all said 
subdivision, and our subject property. 
9. The apparent encroachment of the existing 
house and outbuildings or other structures, 
onto property adjacent to our subject 
property, as disclosed by a survey of subject 
property. 
Concededly, the words "Accurate Resurvey" were even capitalized by 
the underwriter. (D2; see also R 99-100) Despite the foregoing, 
Mr. Englert, without indicating any possible discrepancies to his 
seller, Mrs. Wertz, who had been recently widowed, purchased the 
property. (T at 389, 392; see also D12) 
Regarding Plaintiff's purchase of the ground, the trial 
court succinctly noted as follows: "The Plaintiffs were aware of 
the boundary dispute when they purchased Lots 12 and 13." (R at 
198) 
The trial court was apparently not concerned with the 
obvious frailties of Whitehead's survey, and based a substantial 
portion of its ultimate ruling upon the assumption that P3 was 
accurate. 
When these Plaintiffs commissioned the 1988 
re-survey of Lots 12 and 13, which lots they 
intended to acquire from one Dorothy Wirtz, they 
discovered that the survey did not follow the river 
as the boundary between Lots 12 and 13 on one the 
hand [sic], and Lots 5, 6 and 7 on the other. 
Indeed the re-survey showed that the Santa Clara 
River runs through Lots 12 and 13 and Lots 6 and 7 
do not abut the river at all. In addition, the re-
survey showed that the homes on Lots 6 and 7 were 
actually situated astride the property boundaries. 
The home built by Karrs on Lot 7 and now occupied 
by the Zanes is actually partially on Lot 7 and 
partially on Lot 12. The home (mobile home with a 
permanent and fixed addition) placed by Myers and 
now occupied by McNeils, is partially on Lot 6, 
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partly on Lot 12, and party [sic] on Lot 13. 
(R 184-85) 
6. SUIT 
Appellants filed suit on May 2, 1989, alleging that 
Respondents' homes encroached upon Appellants' resurveyed lot 
lines. (R at 1; T at 10) Appellants' complaint sought only 
equitable relief, that is, removal of the so-called encroaching 
homes, and attorney's fees. (R at 3; T at 10) Before 1989, no one 
had ever challenged the properties' boundary as bordering the Santa 
Clara River. Indeed, no person, other than Appellants, have ever 
claimed their property went on both sides of the river. (T 258) 
At the conclusion of trial, a colloquy between Plaintiff's counsel 
and the trial court recognized the broad discretion of that Court, 
which had additionally conducted an on-site view, to not only deny 
equitable relief, but to recommend, indeed, affirmative equitable 
relief to possibly resolve the encroachment, in terms of legal 
damages• 
THE COURT: All right. So you're saying if I 
determine there is an encroachment, and none of 
Mr. Hughes' defenses, in terms of adverse 
possession or profit a prendre apply, that I simply 
ought to do the mathematics and determine what 
damages you get, depending on how big a piece of 
property they get—the people who built the houses 
on Lots 12 and 13 get to keep? is that what you're 
saying? 
MR. FOREMASTER: Well, our—yes. In effect, our 
preference is you make them move the encroachments. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm sure you realize I'm highly 
unlikely to do that. We've got 80 an $85,000 
houses, and we've got two lots that cost 22,900 in 
total, a large portion of which will still be left 
even if the encroachments remain. In weighing 
those equities, obviously I'm going to come down in 
favor of not removing the houses. 
MR. FOREMASTER: I've been assuming that. 
18 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. FOREMASTER: So assuming that assumption is 
correct, then I think under the law, that it would 
be the Court's responsibility to determine the size 
of the encroachment and the amount of the damage. 
That's as I see it. (T 451-52) 
7. ENCROACHMENT ANALYSIS/COMPARABLE EQUITIES 
In analyzing the various encroachments and equitable 
positions of the parties, the trial court's memorandum decision, 
with some commentary/ is telling: 
The Plaintiffs testified that in their opinion 
the property north and west of the Santa Clara 
River had a value of fifty cents per square foot. 
They also testified that if the Defendants were 
allowed to take a portion of the property north and 
west of the Santa Clara River from Lots 12 and 13, 
any portion remaining on that side of the river 
would be reduced in value by one-half. See T at 
379-81. On the other hand, Mr. Walter testified on 
the basis of his expertise regarding values in the 
subdivision and real property generally in that 
area of Washington County that land values have 
decreased about 20 per cent [sic] since the 
Plaintiffs bought Lots 12 and 13 from Mrs. Wirtz at 
a total price of $22,900.00 for both lots. See T 
at 186. That purchase price equates to 25 cents 
per square foot. 
Actually, Appellants' purchase price technically worked out to 
23.467 cents per square foot. (T at 387) Furthermore, Mr. Englert 
conceded that both Lots 12 and 13 needed substantial additional 
elevation and fill, and the Court's on-site review revealed sheer 
cliffs abutting the rear. 
The Court continued its analysis by examining the 
potential cost of relocating the encroaching structures, and indeed 
changing the parties' prior user: 
It also appears that if the encroaching 
structures are moved they would be destroyed, or 
severely damages and that those structures are 
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valued at $80,000•00 to $85,000.00 each. These 
structures appear to have been in place for less 
than 20 years in the case of the McNeils and over 
20 years in the case of the Zanes prior to the 
filing of this lawsuit. (R at 196-97; see T at 
209, 211, 227-28) 
The Court thereafter stated as follows: 
As the subdivision was actually laid out the 
river would run through Lots 12 and 13 and divide 
those lots. That would leave small parcels of Lots 
12 and 13 to the north and west of the river which 
would not be suitable for construction of 
residences and which would not be accessable [sic] 
from the main portion of those lots without 
construction of a bridge at considerable expense in 
view of the fact that the river often rises 
dramatically during the runoff season. See T at 
86. 
The Plaintiffs have not undertaken 
construction of improvements on Lots 12 and 13 and 
there remains on the southeast side of the river 
sufficient area for the Plaintiffs to construct a 
residence as they testified they desired to do. 
(R at 197-98) 
Clearly, the Court had great discretion in balancing the 
equities in the instant case. On pages 449-50 of the transcript, 
the following exchange occurs between Plaintiff's counsel and the 
Court: 
MR. FOREMASTER: . . . The encroachments—here 
again, it was a little bit difficult for us to put 
a value before you on the loss for the 
encroachment, because we didn't know just what size 
of encroachment you'd find. Hence the use of the 
square footage figure rather than an overall 
balance or overall figure. 
THE COURT: I understand. 
MR. FOREMASTER: So that I would think that if you 
decide that the legal remedies should be applied, 
then a determination would have to be made as to 
the size of whatever encroachments you're going to 
receive, whether it goes to the—whether it goes to 
just where the homes sit, or whether you go back to 
the legal setback as provided by the zoning in 
place at the time, or whether you go to the 
testimony of Mr. Santamaria or some other witness 
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as to footage back from the house. Whatever vou 
find is appropriate. And I—of course I think it's 
a simple matter to take the figures given and 
calculate out what the damage would be. Id. , 
emphasis added. 
Regarding values, Appellants' counsel ultimately conceded that that 
also was within the prerogative of the trier of fact. (T at 450) 
Once again, at pages 450-51, the Court and Appellants' attorney 
engage in the following exchange: 
MR. FOREMASTER: . . . property owners are entitled 
to give their opinion as to values of their 
property, which is an exception to the general rule 
regarding expert appraisers or experts. And I 
think that was a correct statement of the law. 
I would say that these—both the plaintiffs 
are unusual property owners in the sense that they 
both dealt in real estate before. Mrs. Englert has 
been involved in—as a broker—or as a salesperson, 
at least, and as a title person. So I think that 
my clients' opinions as to value and the value of 
damage probably, in our opinion, at least, would 
bear more study and consideration than—than a 
property—an average property owner. 
I think their opinion is every bit as good as 
Mr. Walter. He possesses no more expertise that I 
hear than my clients do. But I'm just going to 
have to let you judge it as you see it, because 
it's up to the trier of fact to make that 
formulation. 
Now, I don't think—I'd rather, with your 
permission, not argue the facets of Mr.— 
THE COURT: I understand. 
In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court condensed its ruling, 
foreshadowed in part by the colloquy above, as follows: 
The Court is of the opinion that the 
Plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law since 
their loss can be compensated by assessment of 
damages in their favor if in fact they are entitled 
to any legal remedy at all. Assessing damages and 
allowing the encroachments to remain will not 
destroy or significantly hinder the intended use 
and enjoyment of the property contemplated by the 
Plaintiffs. (R at 198) 
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In analyzing Respondents' defenses, the trial court first 
found that the Zanes and their predecessors in interest had 
established boundary by acquiescence to the river's edge, and were 
that not the case, a prescriptive easement had otherwise ripened. 
See MD, R at 200-05, 206-07. 
8. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING 
The Court found the evidence on user, however, did not 
extend for the full twenty years on behalf of the McNeils. The 
Court, however, having surprisedly rejected the adverse possession 
argument on behalf of the Zanes, obviously held the same 
unavailable to protect the McNeils. At trial, Appellants' attorney 
proffered through Mr. Whitehead, Appellants' engineer, the square 
footage of the encroachments extending all the way to the river. 
No other square footages, setback, or zoning requirements were 
offered to the Court. (T at 135-40) It was found that the McNeil 
residence and usage encroached 5,401.84 square feet on one lot, 
said encroachment being denominated by the surveyor and counsel as 
Parcel B, and that the McNeil parcel encroached on the other lot 
7,396.42 square feet, the same being denominated by both counsel 
and Mr. Whitehead as Parcel C. Id. These were the only figures in 
Appellants' proffer, which proffer was accepted by Respondents. Id. 
The Court's ruling, which in effect provided a legal remedy to 
Appellants, is summarized as follows: 
Upon stipulation, the parties agreed that 
parcel B contains 5,401.84 square feet and parcel C 
contains 7,396.42 square feet. The total of those 
parcels is therefore 12, 798.26 square feet, which 
the Court will round down to 12,798.00. Plaintiffs 
purchased Lots 12 and 13 together at a total cost 
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of $22,900.00, or about 25 cents per square foot. 
Plaintiffs contend that the property has doubled in 
value and cite as proof certain "comparable sales" 
in the area. The Court can accord no weight to 
those "comparable sales" since Plaintiffs candidly 
admitted they had never seen those properties and 
had no idea how they actually compared to the 
property in dispute, including whether they had 
been improved. See T at 387-89, 414, 421. 
On the other hand Defendants offered the 
testimony of Mr. Walter who opined that the value 
of B.S.H.S. property has declined 20 percent since 
the Plaintiffs purchase in 1988. No supporting 
evidence was offered for Mr. Walter's opinion. See 
T at 205, 427-32. 
The Court finds that the best indicator of the 
value of the property is the amount Plaintiff's 
[sic] paid when they purchased in 1988, or 25 cents 
per square foot. (MD at R 208-09) 
It could not be gainsaid that Mrs. Englert had indicated that the 
only usable value on the Zane and McNeil side of their lots was for 
quiet enjoyment, and not for construction. (T at 421) 
Thus, as a result, the trial court allowed the Zanes to 
peacefully continue possessing their property, and awarded the 
Plaintiff a judgment against the McNeils for $3,199.50, plus 
interest from the date of filing suit to the date of trial at ten 
percent, the entire amount to bear interest at the judgment rate 
from and after October 26th until paid in full. (MD at 209) 
9. APPEAL 
Appellants now seek to restrict the trial court's legal 
remedy, apparently seeking appellate recalculation by divination of 
the amount of the encroachment. Furthermore, Appellants seek 
reversal of the trial courtfs application of boundary by 
acquiescence and profit a prendre in the instant case. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. THE STANDARD OP REVIEW UNDER UTAH LAW PROVIDES THAT A TRIAL 
COURT'S FINDINGS SHALL NOT BE SET ASIDE UNLESS CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS 
In light of the foregoing, and the trial court's 
exclusive prerogative to weigh the witnesses, it is clear that a 
substantial amount of evidence supports the trial court's ruling. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY 
BY ACQUIESCENCE 
In the instant case, the trial court adopted the Santa 
Clara River as an appropriate monument to which the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence could apply. The other elements as 
established by Utah decisional authority amply supports the trial 
court's decision. 
III. THE DOCTRINE OF PROFIT A PRENDRE WAS CORRECTLY APPLIED IN THE 
INSTANT CASE 
The evidence vastly supported the application of this 
doctrine to the Zanes, who with their predecessors in interest, had 
occupied their home with customary usage to the edge of the river 
at least twenty-one years prior to Appellants' filing of suit. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD THAT BOTH RESPONDENT FAMILIES 
HAD ADVERSELY POSSESSED LOTS 6 AND 7 OF BROOKS IDE SUMMER HOMES 
SUBDIVISION 
Evidence from both the County Assessor's office and the 
County Treasurer's office support this conclusion, which departs 
from Utah case law as illustrated by Affleck v. Morgan. 12 Utah 2d 
200, 364 P.2d 663 (Utah 1961). 
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V. THE APPELLANTS, ON THE BASIS OF SEVERAL APPLICABLE EQUITABLE 
DOCTRINES, FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE NECESSARY PREREQUISITES TO 
MANDATE REMOVAL OF RESPONDENTS1 ENCROACHMENTS. 
The record supports that Appellants are not bona fide 
purchasers of the property, nor does a balancing of equities 
support removal of Respondents' encroachments, so that Appellants 
might have casual enjoyment of the property. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ACT ARBITRARILY IN STRUCTURING ITS 
REMEDY FOR BOTH APPELLANTS AND RESPONDENTS IN THE INSTANT 
CASE. 
Balancing the equities therein, and based on the evidence 
proffered by Appellants and received upon Respondents' stipulation, 
the trial court's actions were well-reasoned and not arbitrary. 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING APPELLANTS1 RESURVEY AS 
DISTURBING THE SANTA CLARA RIVER AS THE NORTH/SOUTH BOUNDARY 
LINE BETWEEN LOTS IN THE BROOKSIDE SUMMER HOMES SUBDIVISION. 
Clearly, a recent survey taken some twenty-three years 
after the creation of the subdivision should not be employed to 
disturb lot lines long adhered to and recognized by both the 
community and the county as being accurate. 
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INTERPRET AND/OR REFORM 
THE NATURE OF THE LANGUAGE APPEARING IN THE DEED 
REFORMATIONS. 
The trial court is clearly imbued with the power of 
reformation, and here the facts amply supported its application. 
IX. THE SUPREME COURT IN THE INSTANT CASE MAY DEEM IT APPROPRIATE 
TO AWARD RESPONDENTS ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR DEFENDING THIS 
APPEAL. 
Under Title 78 of the Utah Code, Respondents are entitled 
to attorney's fees in the event an appeal, based on the law and 
facts of the case, appears frivolous in nature. Respondents 
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suggest that it is within this Courtfs discretion to consider an 
award of attorneys fees to them on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPROPRIATE STANDARDS OP APPELLATE REVIEW COMPEL 
AFFIRMATION OF THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT 
Prior to July 1, 1985, Article 8, § 9 of the Utah 
Constitution specifically set forth a greater standard of review in 
equitable cases. See e.g. . Reed v. Alvev. 610 P.2d 1374 (Utah 
1980); Bown v. Loveland. 678 P.2d 292 (Utah 1984). Under this 
standard, the Appellate court could not reverse the trial court 
judgment unless the evidence in the case clearly preponderated 
against its findings. In Adams v. Gubler. 731 P.2d 494 (Utah 
1986), however, Justice Durham, speaking for a unanimous Utah 
Supreme Court, noted that even though the former constitutional 
section had been redrafted, Rule 52(a) U.R.C.P., which became 
effective January 1, 1987, provides that findings of fact "shall 
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous." Id. at 496, n. 3. 
This standard applied regardless of whether the case is one in 
equity or one in law. See Barker v. Francis. 741 P.2d 548 (Utah 
App. 1987); see also. Lemon v. Coates, 735 P.2d 58 (Utah 1987). 
Most recently, in Judd Family Limited Partnership v. Hutchings, 797 
P. 2d 1088 (Utah 1990), Justice Howe stated the applicable standard 
as follows: 
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, forbids 
us from setting aside factual findings unless 
clearly erroneous, giving due regard to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses. We find nothing in 
the trial court's findings of fact which would 
suggest that they are erroneous, let alone "clearly 
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erroneous." In Scharf v. BMG Corp. , 700 P.2d 1068, 
1070 (Utah 1985) , we stated that we would not 
overturn a finding of fact without first marshaling 
[sic) all the evidence supporting the finding and 
then demonstrating that when viewed in the light 
most favorable to the trial court, the evidence is 
clearly insufficient to support that finding. Id. 
at 9. 
The second portion of Rule 52(a) U.R.C.P. indicates that 
due regard "shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses." As before indicated, the 
trial court in the instant case was able to hear the testimony and 
judge each witness1 credibility. It was able to weigh any conflict 
in that testimony, and by reason of an on-site view of the property 
conducted during the trial, the trial court could, without advocacy 
from either party, form a judicial and unbiased conclusion as to 
the equities in the instant case. The trial court's memorandum 
decision, and the findings of fact which parallel the same, are 
supported by a plethora of evidence in the record. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERTY APPLIED THE DOCTRINE OF 
BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE 
Appellants apparently contend that the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence is inapplicable because a river cannot 
create a visible line to which an adjoining property owner can 
acquiesce to as a boundary line. (AB at 5) Secondly, Appellants 
spuriously assert the following: 
There is absolutely nothing in the record that 
supports the contention of the Defendants Zane that 
they or their predecessors occupied the subject 
land up to the center of the Santa Clara River for 
the necessary length of time. (AB at 11) 
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In reply, it should be noted that the trial court 
initially concluded that the Santa Clara River was non-navigable. 
(T at 278-82) As such, occupation to the river's edge, absent 
other intended reservations, would allow the riparian landowners 
ownership to the centerline of the river. See 93 C.J.S. "Waters", 
§ 71 at pp. 745-46. Indeed, the Colorado case of Moore v. Johnson. 
568 P.2d 437 (Colorado 1977) states the general rule as follows: 
The general rule of law . . . is that a deed 
conveying land bordered by a non-navigable stream 
includes the bed to the center or thread of the 
stream if the stream is described as a boundary or 
monument. . . whether the rule prevails in a given 
case is to be determined by consideration of the 
language used and the surrounding circumstances 
which are proffered and may be considered to 
ascertain the intention of the parties. 568 P.2d 
437 at 439. (citations omitted) 
In the instant case, it was clearly the intent of the 
subdivider to convey, at the very least, to the edge of the river, 
if indeed not to the middle thereof. Furthermore, it was clearly 
established by the evidence that the Zanes, as well as the McNeils 
and their predecessors in interest, had occupied the land 
consistent with customary ownership to the edge of the river. In 
the Zane's case, such occupation and usage clearly exceeded twenty 
years. In the McNeil's case, the evidence was somewhat 
contradictory, but established a clear usage of approximately 
nineteen years at the time Appellants filed suit. 
The trial court, having heard the testimony of the 
parties, and giving particular weight to the testimony of 
Mr. Walter, together with that of disinterested nonparties, such as 
Wes Arnold, found clear occupation of the property to the river's 
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edge on behalf of both parties. To attack these findings, 
Appellants must somehow successfully assert that they are "clearly 
erroneous" under applicable standards of appellate review. Not 
only are the same not clearly erroneous, they are fully supported 
by the evidence. 
Utah courts have long recognized the doctrine of boundary 
by acquiescence. At times, however, the doctrine appears to have 
mistakenly merged with the doctrine of boundary by agreement. See. 
e.g. , Halladav v. Cluff, 685 P.2d 500 at 503 (Utah 1984). 
Recently, the Halladay opinion has been modified by the case of 
Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417 (Utah 1990). Indeed, Staker 
reversed the Halladay case's requirement that there be "objective 
uncertainty as to the real location of the boundaries". The Staker 
case now presents four elements requisite to the doctrine's 
applicability: (1) occupation up to a visible line marked by 
monuments, fences or buildings, (2) mutual acquiescence in the line 
as a boundary, (3) for a long period of time, (4) by adjoining 
landowners. Id. at 26. 
The trial court, in its memorandum decision, correctly 
addressed the thrust of the Staker decision. (R at 200) The trial 
court then struggled with the issue of whether a river could 
otherwise constitute a sufficient monument of a boundary to 
establish the above elements. The court, with numerous citation to 
sister states, as well as C.J.S., resolved the issue in favor of 
Respondents. (R at 201) 
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Though the trial court indicated that its review of Utah 
case law did not indicate whether a river constitutes a sufficient 
monument, it is clear that the trial court struggled with the 
economies of time and the research otherwise placed before it by 
counsel. A thorough research of Utah law, however, supports the 
trial judge's reasoned conclusions. For example, in the case of 
Olsen v. Park Daughters' Investment Company, 29 Utah 2d. 421, 511 
P.2d 145 (Utah 1973) , the Utah Supreme Court considered whether the 
Provo River could constitute a visible monument for the application 
of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. In Olsen. the area 
over which the disputed boundaries arose was commonly referred to 
as "the river bottoms". See 29 Utah 2d. 421 at 423. Justice 
Crockett, writing for a unanimous Utah Supreme Court, applied the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, thus quieting title to the 
Defendants to the edge of that river. Id. at 425. In applying the 
doctrine, the Utah Supreme Court in Olsen states as follows: 
It is for this reason that it has seemed sound 
policy that boundary lines which have been long 
established and accepted by those who should be 
concerned should be left undisturbed in order to 
leave at rest matters which may have resulted in 
controversy and litigation, wherefore there has 
developed a doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. 
Its essence is that where there arises a dispute as 
to the boundary between properties and it appears 
that there is a recognizable physical boundary of 
any character, which has been acquiesced and is a 
boundary for a long period of time, the conflict 
should be conclusively presumed to have been 
reconciled in some manner. It is our opinion that 
the policy of encouraging peace and good order and 
of discouraging trouble and controversy demands 
that that be accepted as the correct doctrine, and 
that it need not depend upon rationalization as to 
ideas of estoppel, presumed agreements, lost rents 
or other fictional concepts. 
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The trial court's ruling below, applying the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence to the Zanes, is decidedly well-reasoned. 
Appellants believe, however, that the last sentence on page 16 of 
the memorandum decision unduly emphasizes the court's failure to 
find the evidence sufficient to establish the period of twenty 
years occupation on behalf of the McNeils and their predecessors in 
interest. (R at 204) While boundary by acquiescence normally 
requires twenty years occupation, there have been repeated 
suggestions by the Utah Supreme Court that indicate that unusual 
circumstances may exist that make the application of the doctrine 
equitable, even where the occupation might have been for a lesser 
period of time. See e.g. . Wood v. Myrup, 681 P.2d 1255 at 1258 
(Utah 1984); Hobson v. Panouitch Lake Corporation, 530 P.2d 792 at 
795 (Utah 1975); King v. Fronk. 14 Utah 2d 135 at 141-2, 378 P.2d 
893, 897 (Utah 1963). In the instant case, as has been previously 
factually established, both the reputation for the boundaries in 
the area, and the intent of the subdivider was to establish the 
river as a line of boundary or demarcation. The Respondents McNeil 
and their predecessors in interest did so for a period of not less 
than 19 years at the time Appellants filed suit. Indeed, when the 
Appellants filed suit, their surveyor had already advised them of 
the potential encroachments; consequently, Appellants are not bona 
fide purchasers. Infra at V (C). Furthermore, the title insurer 
begged off underwriting over Respondents1 obvious occupation of the 
property by numerous exceptions in the title policy. Appellants 
conceded that they had made their purchase subject to an approved 
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survey, and could have backed out. Instead, Appellants proceeded, 
first by purchasing the property, and then by seeking to oust 
Respondents and their "encroachments" from Appellants1 property, 
platted on the basis of an erroneous resurvey. Clearly, if an 
inroad can be equitably created reducing the twenty-year 
requirement by one year, then this case mandates its reduction. 
Respondents urge this Court not only to affirm the application of 
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence as to the Zanes, but to 
further apply the same to the McNeils. It is respectfully 
submitted that the trial court's opinion as to boundary by 
acquiescence is unassailable, but should be extended to protect 
Respondents McNeil. 
III. THE DOCTRINE OP PROFIT A PRENDRE WAS CORRECTLY 
APPLIED IN THE INSTANT CASE 
The trial court's memorandum decision awarding a 
prescriptive easement in favor of the Zanes is found at R 206-207. 
Succinctly stated, the trial court correctly applied that doctrine 
in finding a prescriptive easement in favor of the Zanes. See 
Anderson v. Osouthorpe, 504 P.2d 1000 (Utah 1972). Ample evidence 
in the record cited in Respondent's factual statement fairly 
supports the trial court's conclusion. 
Respondent's counsel's review of Utah law does not 
support any suggestion that any period less than twenty years might 
be allowed. To the same extent, however, that inferences have 
arisen in the application of the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence to suggest that a period of time somewhat less than 
twenty years might be available under particular equitable 
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circumstances, Respondents urge that this court may, as an 
alternative form of relief to the McNeils, relax this requirement 
to create a prescriptive easement on their behalf. The trial 
court, bound by the doctrines of stare decisis, held that as the 
McNeils could only show occupation for nineteen years, they were 
not entitled to the easements otherwise supported by Utah law as 
represented by the Oscruthorpe case. Equity may, however, compel a 
slight moderation of the doctrine herein. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE DOCTRINE OF 
ADVERSE POSSESSION TO BOTH THOSE PARCELS VISIBLY 
OCCUPIED UNDER COLOR OF TITLE BY THE 
ZANES AND THE MCNEILS 
The Brookside Summer Homes Subdivision was a rural 
subdivision. It is further established that there is no clear 
evidence before the Court as to where the Defendants Zane or 
McNeil's lots, to-wit, Lots 6 and 7, are accurately located. 
Reputation testimony, however, received at trial, coupled with the 
testimony of the parties and the on-site view of the trial court 
resulted in several findings pertaining to the usage of the ground, 
as is recorded in the court's memorandum decision at R 192-94. 
Clearly, for the trial court to have found a prescriptive easement, 
and indeed, boundary by acquiescence on behalf of the Zanes, he was 
finding that the usage of the property to the river's edge was 
within the ordinary use of occupants appropriate to the location 
and character of the property. See e.g. , Daw Steele 184 P.2d 216 
(Utah 1947). Furthermore, the trial court found that the McNeils, 
though not entitled to these defenses had, for a period of 
approximately nineteen years, together with their predecessors in 
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interest, maintained and cultivated the ground in a manner and form 
substantially similar to that of the Zanes. (R at 194) 
Section 78-12-9 of the Utah Code states that where title 
is founded on a written instrument, land is deemed to have been 
possessed and occupied for purposes of adverse possession in the 
following cases: 
(1) Where it has been usually cultivated or 
improved. (2) Where it has been protected by a 
substantial enclosure. (3) . . . (4) Where a known 
farm or single lot has been partly improved, the 
portion of such farm or lot that may have been left 
not cleared or not enclosed according to the usual 
course and custom of the adjoining county is deemed 
to have been occupied for the same length of time 
as the part improved and cultivated. 
Viewing the above statutory language, it is clear that both the 
Zanes and the McNeils occupied to the riverfs edge, claiming title 
under written instruments, to-wit, their deeds to Lots 6 and 7 of 
the Brookside Summer Homes Subdivision. Furthermore, though the 
trial court found that the taxes were assessed on the basis of the 
property lines, as shown on the subdivision plat, and not on the 
basis of the location of the river, this conclusion is expressly 
contravened by the County Assessor, County Treasurer and two 
appraisers retained by the County Assessor's office. These 
witnesses all testified that the practice in Washington County was 
to assess the improvements and values of the property in Brookside 
to the river's edge. Supra at 10, 13. 
Both the Zanes, the McNeils and their predecessors in 
interest, apparently in ignorance of the actual boundaries, which 
as of the date of this brief have never been established, 
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nonetheless took and held possession by mistake up to a certain 
line, over a period of time well beyond that required by adverse 
possession in the State of Utah. It was their intent to claim 
title, and indeed they did so, despite the fact that Mr. Walter's 
instructions to Mr. Newville to draw the boundary lines between the 
lots based upon the course of the Santa Clara River was not 
correctly followed. See Findings of Fact 4 and 5; R at 261. In 
light of this, Respondents respectfully assert that the following 
language from 3 Am. Jur. 2d, "Adverse Possession", § 58 is 
literally on all fours with the their case: 
It is a widely accepted rule that where a 
landowner, in ignorance of actual boundaries, takes 
and holds possession by mistake up to a certain 
line beyond boundary limits, on the claim and in 
the belief that it is the true line, with the 
intention to claim title, and if necessary to 
acquire title by possession up to that line, such 
possession, having the requisite duration and 
continuity, will ripen into title. Thus, the mere 
fact that the possession originated in a mistake or 
in ignorance as to the location of the true 
boundary line will not prevent the running of the 
statute of limitations, for if the person in 
possession intends to claim the land to the line 
occupied and possession of it is open and exclusive 
for the statutory period, such possession will be 
held to be hostile and to vest the title in the 
claimant under the statute, even though the land 
was not inclosed. If the occupant of the disputed 
area is under a mistaken belief that it is included 
in the description of the deed—a state of mind 
sometimes described as pure mistake to distinguish 
it from the cases of conscious doubt—then the 
possession is hostile. 
The Utah case of Affleck v. Morgan. 12 Utah 2d 200, 364 
P.2d 663 (Utah 1961) is illustrative, and parallels in large part 
the factual setting of the instant case. In Affleck, the 
Plaintiffs filed an action to quiet title for land and for trespass 
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thereon, basing their claim on the fact that a new survey revealed 
that the Plaintiff's northern boundary was twenty-two feet north of 
an old line that had been established for many years. The lower 
court found for the Plaintiffs, granting the Defendant some limited 
easement rights. On appeal, however, Justice Callister, speaking 
for a unanimous Utah Supreme Court, reversed, and found that the 
Defendants were entitled to disregard the resurvey and consider it 
as having no effect on the ownership of their property. The basis 
of the decision was founded in adverse possession, by reason of the 
fact that the improvements, though technically located on the 
Plaintiff's real property, had been taxed and assessed by the 
Assessor's office, and said taxes had been paid by the Defendants 
throughout the period of adverse possession. The Court's language, 
found at 12 Utah 2d 205 is no less applicable today: 
The defendants have paid taxes on the real 
property bordered by the solid line, triangular 
shaped, and designated as the "Morgan Property" on 
the map. Although the tax notices describe the 
"Morgan Property," the assessment was based upon 
the improvements which are located on the strip of 
land in dispute. Thus the amount assessed for the 
improvements has been paid by the defendants even 
though they (the improvements) were not in fact 
located on the property described in the tax 
notices. 
Clearly, the Supreme Court in Affleck looked beyond the actual 
resurveyed descriptions and rather considered the practical aspects 
of the taxing and assessment system, which taxed the above-ground 
improvements as if they had been appropriately situate on 
Defendants' property. In Affleck, as in the instant case, evidence 
suggested that the improvements may have been on the Plaintiff's 
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ground, but as in Affleck, the instant case also provides a 
plethora of evidence that suggests that all the improvements and 
all the benefit conferred to the ground all the way to the river's 
edge abutting Lots 6 and 7 was taxed solely to the Zanes and the 
McNeils and their predecessors in interest. As in Affleck, this 
Court should quiet title to the Zanes and McNeils, and remand the 
case accordingly. 
V. THE APPELLANTS, ON THE BASIS OF SEVERAL APPLICABLE 
DOCTRINES, FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE NECESSARY 
PREREQUISITES TO MANDATE REMOVAL OF 
RESPONDENTS1 ENCROACHMENTS 
A. THE PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE NECESSARY 
PREREQUISITES FOR A MANDATORY INJUNCTION 
Plaintiffs1 resurvey, commissioned in August of 1988, 
was, according to Plaintiffs1 own surveyor, an incorrect survey. 
Indeed, Mr. Whitehead testified that it was based upon the earlier 
survey of Mr. Newville, which did not accurate plat the lots, as 
depicted and described within the subdivision. Furthermore, 
Whitehead clarified that the survey did nothing to accurately 
locate the position of Lots 6 and 7, and readily conceded the 
possibility of there being an overlap between Lots 6 and 7 and Lots 
12 and 13, if the survey had ever been properly platted. 
Respondents suggest that, based upon the very frailty of 
this evidence, that Appellants failed to sustain the burden 
requisite to establish an appropriate boundary line prerequisite 
to a claim for ejectment. 
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B. THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY REJECTED PLAINTIFF'S 
REQUEST FOR REMOVAL OF DEFENDANTS' ALLEGEDLY 
ENCROACHING STRUCTURES 
In every case where a Plaintiff seeks removal of a 
structure allegedly encroaching upon its ground, courts must 
balance the equities in determining whether the encroachment 
should, indeed, be removed. An overview of the applicable law, 
particularly those factors determining whether removal would be 
mandated, is found at Annotation, "Mandatory Injunction to Compel 
Removal of Encroachments by Adjoining Landowner", 28 A.L.R. 2d 679. 
Sister states are clearly in accord with the doctrine that equity 
courts are not bound by rigid rules of common law, but may adapt 
the relief requested to satisfy the requirement of the case, and to 
protect and conserve the parties' varying interests. See e.g. . 
Malnar v. Whitfield, 774 P.2d 1075 (Okla. App. 1989); Garcia v. 
Sanchez, 772 P.2d 1311 (New Mex. App. 1989). 
That such a balancing procedure is employed by Utah 
courts is evident from the 1936 Utah case, Mary Jane Stevens Co. v. 
First National Building Co.. 57 P.2d 1099. In Mary Jane Stevens. 
the Utah Supreme Court held that in balancing the equities, the 
encroaching party could be legally assessed damages to compensate 
Plaintiff when the hardship or cost of removal was otherwise unduly 
burdensome. Similarly, in an early case of Lewis v. Pinaree 
National Bank. 151 P. 558 (Utah 1915), the Utah Supreme Court also 
held that the fact that an encroachment may constitute a public 
nuisance does not necessarily compel its abatement. Indeed, all of 
the cases suggest that the equities must always be balanced. 
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C APPELLANTS ARE NOT BONA FIDE PURCHASERS, AND, AS 
SUCH, WERE NOT ENTITLED TO EQUITABLE RELIEF 
Appellants contend on page 5 of their brief that there 
was neither anything done nor of record "to put a bona fide third 
party purchaser on notice" of Respondents1 claims pertaining to 
their occupation of their homes to the river's edge. By this 
statement, Respondents assume that Appellants are characterizing 
themselves as bona fide purchasers. The term itself requires a 
purchase in good faith for value and without notice. See Big Four 
Petroleum Company v. Quirk. 755 P.2d 632 (Okla. 1988). In 77 Am. 
Jur. 2d, "Vendor and Purchaser," § 646, the authors define "good 
faith" as consisting of an honest intention to abstain from taking 
any unconscientious advantage of another. Regarding notice, 77 Am. 
Jur. then indicates the following: 
Notice of a prior interest which will be 
effective to charge a subsequent purchaser with 
knowledge of its existence may be either direct 
information of the prior right, or may consist of 
information or facts from which actual knowledge 
may be inferred; the notice need not be actual, but 
may be constructive or implied. It need not 
contain complete information of every fact material 
for the purchaser to know. Where actual notice of 
an outstanding interest is duly given, the 
purchaser is chargeable with notice of all that an 
inquiry of the person giving the notice of the 
outstanding interest would have disclosed. Id., 
§ 647, emphasis added. 
In the instant case, it is obvious that Appellants had 
notice both from their surveyor, Mr. Whitehead, and from the 
extensive limitations in their title policy, that there were 
apparent encroachments by reason of homes occupied by other 
parties, homes which allegedly overlapped land which Appellants 
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intended to purchase. With the foregoing in mind, and without 
notification to their sellers or prior discussion with Respondents 
herein, Appellants completed their purchase. 
In Blodaett v. Martsch. 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978), the 
Utah Supreme Court held that a bona fide purchaser is one who takes 
without actual or constructive knowledge of facts sufficient to put 
him on notice of the complainant's equity. Id. at 303, citing, 
inter alia. Sieger v. Standard Oil Company. 318 P.2d 479 (Cal. 
App. 1957). Lest there be any confusion in the instant case, the 
testimony of Charles Englert, a man who had purchased over 100 
parcels of real estate, and his wife, a retired broker and title 
officer, clearly established that they were fully aware that their 
title was clouded on the date of purchase. They contended at trial 
that they had personally offered to sell the disputed land to 
Respondents for twenty-five cents a square foot. This testimony 
shocked Respondents, who uniformly proffered, with no cross-
examination, that no such offer had ever been made. Subsequent to 
the trial court1s award to Appellants of twenty-five cents a square 
foot as to the McNeils, Appellants seek reversal of the entire 
decision, again seemingly desiring the power to prohibit 
Respondents from accessing the river. Clearly, the equities in 
this case mandate otherwise. 
D. ONE SEEKING EQUITY MUST HAVE CLEAN HANDS 
In the instant case, Appellants do not come before the 
court as bona fide purchasers with clean hands. Historically, 
mandatory injunctions requiring removal of an encroachment by an 
40 
adjoining landowner have been refused where Plaintiff was not in 
court with clean hands. See Ann. 28 A.L.R. 2d, § 12 at p. 719. 
Utah cases have also recognized the prerequisite of clean hands for 
one seeking an equitable, rather than legal solution. See Park v. 
Jamison. 364 P.2d 112, Utah 2d 141 (1961); Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 
557 P.2d 156 (Utah 1976). In the Oklahoma case of Big Four 
Petroleum Co. v. Quirk. 755 P.2d 632 (Okla. 1988), the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court, once again addressing the definition of good faith 
purchasers, which is inextricably entwined, in terms of equity, 
with the clean hands doctrine, cited Wilson v. Pennington. 474 P.2d 
658 (Okla. 1970), for the following proposition: 
A purchaser with notice is considered a purchaser 
made male fide, and a purchaser with notice is not 
entitled to protection as a bona fide purchaser, 
but takes subject to outstanding interests, even 
though he may have given full value. In such case, 
the purchaser stands in the same position as the 
one from whom he purchased. 
The Englerts do not have clean hands; they are male fide 
purchasers. The equitable solution, fashioned in large part by the 
trial court judge, recognized appropriate equitable principles and 
properly applied them to do equity to the only innocent parties in 
the case, that is, Respondents. 
E. THE GENERAL RULE OF LAW FAVORS THE IMPOSITION OF 
LEGAL DAMAGES OVER EQUITABLE REMEDIES 
Where there is a legal remedy available to the parties, 
to which resort may be had without any substantial or irreparable 
damage, the parties may not ordinarily seek equitable relief. See 
Erisman v. Overman. 11 Utah 2d 258, 358 P.2d 85 (1961). Thus, 
equity will not intervene and require the removal of an 
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encroachment when there is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at 
law. See S.P.C.S.. Inc. v. Lockheed Shipbuilding and Construction 
Co., 631 P.2d 999 (Wash. App. 1981). So strong is this doctrine 
that sister states have held that one seeking the interposition of 
equity must, as a prerequisite, show that he has no remedy at law, 
or that no legal remedy is otherwise adequate. See Knaebel v. 
Heiner, 663 P.2d 551 (Alaska 1983); see also 30 C.J.S. "Equity", 
§ 20, et. sec. 
In the instant case, the availability of an adequate and 
determinable legal remedy was clearly evident to the trier of fact. 
Evidence as to values of the alleged encroachment was put before 
the court by both parties. Appellants called themselves as 
witnesses, and Respondents countered with Mr. Russ Walter, as well 
as cross-examination of Appellants. Furthermore, the amount of the 
so-called encroachment, in terms of the exact square feet, was 
proffered by Appellants, through their engineer, Mr. Whitehead; 
this proffer as to the square feet of the encroachment was accepted 
by Respondents and duly noted in the record and memorandum decision 
by the Court. Neither party presented any evidence of setbacks or 
of any square footage, either lesser or greater in nature than that 
extrapolated by Appellants' engineer and submitted by Appellants at 
trial for Respondents1 approval, which approval was received. The 
evidence was clearly before the court to fashion a legal remedy, 
and the court, in its discretion, did so. That discretion should 
not be disturbed on appeal, absent clear abuse. Appellants have 
not met their burden. 
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VI. POINT III OP APPELLANTS1 BRIEF/ WHICH INDICATES THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT ACTED ARBITRARILY IN STRUCTURING ITS 
EQUITABLE REMEDY FOR THE McNEILS TO ACCOMMODATE 
THEIR ALLEGED ENCROACHMENT, SHOULD BE SUMMARILY 
REJECTED 
In Point III of Appellant's brief, Appellant's counsel 
states that the trial court "acted completely arbitrarily and with 
no factual support upon which to base its acts." (AB at 14) In 
point of fact, Appellants now argue that in fashioning a legal 
remedy, the trial court should somehow have whittled down a smaller 
section of land than that awarded to the McNeils, which was to the 
edge of the Santa Clara River. Appellants now state that the trial 
court should have considered such things as the "location of septic 
tanks, plumbing, electrical connections, zoning requirements for 
side yards and setbacks, and the livable spaces necessary to make 
such a home saleable in the market . . . " Id. It was Appellants, 
however, who, through their surveyor provided the court with the 
alleged square footage of the encroachments, and it was Appellants 
who failed to indicate to the Court any possible way in which these 
encroachments might otherwise be limited. 
The square footage of the alleged encroachments was 
proffered into evidence by the Appellants through their engineer 
and surveyor. This proffer was accepted. Appellants now complain, 
however, that 
[n]othing was said about applicable zoning 
regulation, setback and side yard requirements, 
land necessary to provide services such as sewer, 
water, telephone and electrical power or any other 
items of like nature. (AB at 14) 
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The fact is, however, that the trial court specifically found that 
there remained, on the southeast side of the river to Lots 12 and 
13, sufficient area for the Plaintiffs to construct a residence as 
they testified they desired to do, (R at 197-98) Furthermore, 
once again, if Appellants wanted to limit the encroachments to 
areas lesser than that proffered by their expert, then the burden 
of proof was certainly on Appellants to provide the trial court 
with evidence to structure a legal remedy which was lesser in 
nature. To complain on appeal about hypothetical evidence of 
zoning and side yard requirements which Appellants failed to 
proffer is absurd. 
The trial court clearly has the discretion to take the 
evidence which it received, compare the equities, and allow the 
encroachment to remain, even were the encroachment to have affected 
the entire parcel purchased by Respondents. That the whole parcel 
may sometimes be affected by the disturbance, and indeed, 
compensated by legal and not equitable damages, is discussed in 
part by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Marv Jane Stevens Co. 
v. First National Building Company, supra. at 39; see also Zerr v. 
Heceta Lodge No. 111. Independent Order of Odd Fellows. 523 P.2d 
1018 (Oregon 1974). 
The colloquy between Appellants1 counsel and the trial 
court judge during the course of proceedings below is telling. 
Recited at length, supra at Section 6, it details an exchange which 
summarizes the visible and factual evidence which was before the 
trial court. As Appellants failed to provide the court with any 
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remedy other than the stipulated square footages requisite to 
calculating damage or the sheer removal of the encroachment, the 
trial court accepted the legal remedy. Appellants1 counsel at 
trial specifically recognized the trial court's discretion in doing 
so. It cannot be gainsaid that Appellants were responsible for the 
square footage calculations to the river's edge through their own 
expert. Furthermore, Appellants' counsel conceded the 
appropriateness of the trial court leaving the "encroachments" 
intact and pursuing a legal remedy. On appeal, Appellants now 
complain about the extent of the remedy fashioned. See 28 Am. Jur. 
2d "Estoppel and Waiver", § 114, 131; see also J.P. Koch, Inc. v. 
J.C. Penny, Inc., 534 P.2d 903 (Utah 1975). 
Simply stated, Point III of Appellants' brief recites a 
scenario of what might have been. The burden of proof to otherwise 
limit the extent of the encroachment by argument and reference to 
side yard requirements and other factors was Appellants. 
Appellants failed to provide the court with any other alternative 
than allowing the encroachment and calculating a valuation based 
upon the square feet proffered by Appellants' engineer and 
surveyor, Mr. Whitehead. The trial court did exactly this, and in 
its colloquy with Appellants' counsel foreshadowed the thrust of 
its opinion. Even with this knowledge, Appellants chose not to 
introduce additional evidence which might suggest a lesser 
alternative to the court. Now, on appeal, they raise their voice 
and seek to criticize for the first time this portion of the trial 
court's decision. Once again, this criticism should fall on deaf 
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ears, as it was Appellants, not Respondents, who bore the burden of 
showing that a lesser encroachment would, nonetheless, do equity to 
both parties. Appellants failed to meet this burden, and should 
not be heard to complain of it on appeal. 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING APPELLANTS1 RESURVEY 
AS DISTURBING THE SANTA CLARA RIVER AS THE NORTH/SOUTH 
BOUNDARY BETWEEN LOTS 6 AND 7 AND LOTS 12 AND 13 
Russell Walter testified that when he created the 
Brookside Summer Homes Subdivision, his specific intent was to use 
the meandering Santa Clara River as the dividing line between lots 
on the east and west of that non-navigable stream. Mr. Walter 
testified that the lots in the subdivision were staked, and that 
when the lots were sold he personally took the purchasers to the 
staked lines, which were placed approximately fifteen feet from the 
river, so that each and every buyer would know that his boundary 
ceased at the edge of the river. In the chain of title to all but 
two of the parcels conveyed, Mr. Walter inserted the reservation 
"less and excepting that portion crossing the Santa Clara River." 
Furthermore, pursuant to Rule 803(20) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, the trial court heard substantial reputation testimony 
concerning the boundaries. A substantial amount of homeowners on 
both sides of the subdivision have constructed their homes, and for 
periods between fifteen and twenty-three years occupied to the edge 
of the river. In light of that, Justice Stewart's opinion in the 
case of Bountiful v. Reillv, 784 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1989) is telling: 
Generally, a resurvey cannot disturb boundaries 
established by original survey monuments, even if 
the original survey was incorrect. Henrie v. Hyer. 
92 Utah 530, 537, 70 P.2d 154, 157 (1937); 
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Washington Rock Company v. Young. 29 Utah 108, 118-
19, 80 P. 382, 386 (1905). This doctrine preserves 
the property rights of individuals who may have 
reasonably relied upon the original survey. 
There is no testimony before the court which indicates 
that either the Zanes or the McNeils or their predecessors in 
interest acted unreasonably in constructing their homes and 
occupying the same to the edge of the river which they understood 
to be their boundary line. It was testified at trial that the 
original survey was incorrect, and that if the stakes were placed 
as Mr. Walter testified, it was done so in a mistaken fashion. 
That portion of the trial court's opinion, which in effect restaked 
Lots 12 and 13 as testified to by surveyor Whitehead is in error 
and should be reversed. Where the original monument as a boundary 
between the lots on the east and west of the centerline of the 
subdivision was known and recognized as the Santa Clara River, that 
monument should not be altered at trial some twenty-three years 
after the creation of the subdivision. 
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INTERPRET AND/OR 
REFORM THE NATURE OF THE LANGUAGE APPEARING IN 
THE RESERVATIONS 
In the chain of title of all but two of the deeds to the 
lots in the Brookside Summer Homes Subdivision, the lot description 
contains the reservation "less and excepting that portion crossing 
the Santa Clara River." Mr. Walter testified, as did others, that 
it was obvious that the homeowners interpreted this provision over 
a period of almost two decades as requiring that their lots 
terminate at the edge of the river. The trial court, impressed 
with the fact that Mr. Newville had failed to follow Mr. Walterfs 
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instruction in preparing PI, the original subdivision Plat, held 
that that mistake rendered the reservation a nullity. In 
paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Findings of Fact, the trial court states 
its presumption and factual findings as follows: 
4. As Mr. Walter sold the lots in his 
subdivision to various buyers he informed each 
buyer whose lots appeared to abut the river that 
they were in fact acquiring title to the center 
line of the river and nothing on the other side of 
the river. This was based upon Mr. Walter's 
assumption that his instructions to Mr. Newville 
had been followed. Mr. Walter also inserted in all 
but two deeds issued in the B.S.H.S. Subdivision a 
reservation which he intended to act as a guarantee 
that even if the course of the river changed the 
boundary line between the lots would change with 
it. The language of the reservation conveyed the 
property "less any part crossing the Santa Clara 
River". This language was contained in the deed 
issued to the first purchaser of Lot 13 and to 
several others thereafter but was not included in 
the chain of deeds to the purchasers of Lot 12. 
5. The Court finds that the reservation in 
the deeds was based on the presumption set forth in 
paragraph four above, which presumption was a 
mistake; as such, the reservation is ineffective 
and a nullity. 
It is suggested herein that the trial court in this case 
was empowered to either construe or reform the chains of title to 
conform to the subdivider's original intent and the reputation in 
the locality, where to do otherwise would result in an injustice. 
The power of reformation and/or interpretation is clearly within 
the province of the judge's equitable authority. See Mabev v. Kay 
Petersen Construction Co.. 682 P.2d 287 (Utah 1984). 
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IX. THE SUPREME COURT IN THE INSTANT CASE MAY DEEM IT 
APPROPRIATE TO AWARD RESPONDENTS ATTORNEY'S 
FEES FOR DEFENDING THIS APPEAL 
Under Title 78 of the Utah Code, Respondents are entitled 
to attorney's fees in the event an appeal, based on the law and 
facts of the case, appears frivolous in nature. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's judgment accomplishes an appropriate 
balancing of equities in the instant case. Respondents, however, 
urge this Court to equitably apply both boundary by acquiescence 
and prescriptive easement doctrines to Respondents McNeil, 
particularly, in light of Appellants' bad faith purchase. 
Respondents also contend that the trial court failed to 
appropriately assess the impact of the assessment and taxation 
system in Washington County regarding adverse possession. 
In 1988, the Santa Clara River had served as a known and 
conceded boundary for twenty-three years. A resurvey, concededly 
in error, should not artificially alter that boundary. Lastly, 
Appellants should not be heard to complain about the trial court's 
determination of damages where the descriptions of the encroachment 
were proffered by them. Appellants position on appeal seems 
frivolous, and begs consideration of an award of attorney's fees. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ay of March, 1992. 
MICHAEL D. HUGHES, FOR 
THOMPSON, HUGHES & REBER 
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AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a four full, true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing APPELLANTS1 BRIEF were placed in the 
United States mail at St. George, Utah, with first-class postage 
thereon fully prepaid on the 
as follows: 
lay of March, 1992, addressed 
Mr. Phillip L. Foremaster 
247 Sugar Leo Road 
St. George, Utah 84770-7944 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES C. ENGLERT and JO ANN 
ENGLERT, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
HENRY E. ZANE and DOROTHY G. ZANE, 
husband and wife; and JOHN A. McNEIL 
and KATHIE McNEIL, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No, 890502581 
This matter came on for trial to the bench on October 
24th & 26th, 1990, the Honorable J. Philip Eves presiding. The 
Plaintiffs, Charles C. and JoAnn Englert were present and 
represented by their attorney, Phillip L. Foremaster. The 
Defendants, Henry E. and Dorothy Zane and John A. and Kathie 
McNeil were present and represented by their attorney, Michael D. 
Hughes. The Defendants had filed a Third Party Complaint naming 
Russell and Patricia Walter and the Lucky 7 Rodeo Corporation, a 
Utah corporation, as Third-party Defendants. Mr. Walter was 
present and all Third-Party Defendants were represented by Gary W. 
Pendleton, their attorney. During the trial the Defendants/Third 
Party Plaintiffs and the Third-Party Defendants reached a 
stipulated settlement of their dispute and upon stipulation of all 
1. 159 
parties the Court dismissed the Third-Party Complaint. 
Thereafter, Mr. Pendleton left and neither he nor those 
represented by him participated further as parties. 
The Court took evidence in the matter, viewed the 
property in question at the request of the parties, and heard 
arguments of counsel. The matter was then taken under 
submission. The Court now renders the following Decision and 
Judgment upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
In the mid-1960's, Russell and Patricia Walter owned a 
tract of land north of the town of Veyo in Washington County, 
Utah. They decided to subdivide the land and in doing so 
eventually created the Brookside Summer Homes Subdivision 
(E.S.H.S.). The property was surveyed by one Jack R. Newville, a 
registered land surveyor and professional engineer. The B.S.H.S. 
plat was approved and recorded in the office of the Washington 
County Recorder in mid-1965. Thereafter, the lots were sold to 
various buyers, primarily by Russell Walter. 
The Washington County Assessor assessed taxes on the 
subdivided lots on the basis on the recorded subdivision plat. 
Prior to survey, Mr. Walter instructed Mr. Newville tha 
he should lay out the subdivision , insofar as possible, to make 
2. 
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the Santa Clara River, which traverses the property, the common 
boundary between the lots on each side. It was Mr. Walter's 
intention and design that the lots on both sides of the river have 
title to the center line of the river. After the subdivision map 
was completed, it appeared that Mr. Walter's instructions had been 
followed as there was a meandering border down the center of the 
subdivision which Mr. Walters, and everyone else, assumed followed 
the course of the river. The location of the river did not appear 
on the subdivision plat. There was no attempt to check on the 
assumption regarding the river border until 1988 when the 
Plaintiffs in this case commissioned a survey of Lots 12 and 13 in 
preparation for purchase thereof. The survey revealed that the 
river was not on the boundary line between those lots and Lots 5, 
6 and 7 which adjoined Lots 12 and 13 on the northwest. 
As Mr. Walter sold the lots in his subdivision to 
various buyers he informed each buyer whose lot appeared to abut 
the river that they were in fact acquiring title to the center 
line of the river and nothing on the other side of the river. 
This was based on Mr. Walter's assumption that his instructions to 
Mr. Newville had been followed. Mr. Walter also inserted in all 
but two deeds issued in the B.S.H.S. subdivision a reservation 
which he intended to act as a guarantee that even if the course of 
3. 
the river changed the boundary line between the lots v/ould change 
with it. The language of the reservation conveyed the property 
"less any part crossing the Santa Clara Piver". This language was 
contained in the deed issued to the first purchaser of Lot 13 and 
to several others thereafter but was not included in the chain of 
deeds to the purchasers of Lot 12. 
In the first year or so after the subdivision was 
recorded/ Mr. Walter sold Lot 7 to Mr. and Mrs. Karr on a Real 
Estate Sales Contract. The Karrs immediately took possession and 
began building a house on the lot which v/as completed by the end 
of 1967 or the beginning of 1968. In 1969, after the real estate 
contract was paid off, Mr. Walter recorded a warranty deed 
transferring title from the Lucky 7 Rodeo Corporation to the 
Karrs. The Karrs were told at the time that they purchased the 
property that they owned the land up to the center of the river 
and were actually taken to the property and shown survey stakes by 
Mr. Walter which he said evidenced that boundary. The Karrs 
purchased the property after receiving those representations. 
Immediately after signing the real estate contract the Karrs began 
using the land to the river's edge for various recreational 
pursuits, as a back yard, for access to the river and for the 
maintenance of landscaping such as grasses and trees. Some of the 
plants in the area were natural and some imported and planted by 
4. 
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the Karrs. The area was kept groomed to the water's edge. Mr. 
Walter observed this use and testified that it continued for 
several years after the Karrs took possession. 
Within a short time after the Karrs bought Lot 7, Mr. 
and Mrs. Glenn Myers bought Lot 6, also on a land sales 
agreement. They also took possession of the property immediately 
and placed a mobile home thereon. The exact date that they 
purchased the property or took possession was not established by 
the evidence but the Karrs and the Myers were among the first 
purchasers in the subdivision. Title to Lot 7 was transferred by 
warranty deed to the Myers in 1972 after they paid off their land 
sales contract. The county tax records indicate a mobile home 
first appeared on the property in the 1970 assessment. The Myers 
were also told by Mr. Walter when they purchased that their land 
extended to the center line of the river. Sometime after their 
purchase of the land, the Myers began using the property to the 
water's edge much in the same way as the Karrs were doing. 
The Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that 
Lots 6 and 7 were used much in the same fashion through various 
owners thereafter to the present title holders, Mr. and 
5. 
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Mrs. Zane on Lot 7 and Mr. and Mrs. McNeil on Lot 6, the testimony 
of Mr. Santa Maria notwithstanding. The Court's onsight 
inspection revealed that both the Zanes and the McNeils continue 
to use the land in the same ways as did their predecessors. 
The Washington County Assessor assumed that the river 
was the boundary between Lots 5, 6 and 7 on one side and Lots 12 
and 13 on the other but the taxes were assessed not on the 
location of the river but on the location of the property lines as 
shown on the subdivision plat recorded in the County Recorder's 
Office. The Court finds that no taxes for Lots 12 and 13 were 
ever paid by the owners of Lots 6 and 7. 
When these Plaintiffs commissioned the 1988 re-survey of 
Lots 12 and 13, which lots they intended to acquire from one 
Dorothy Wirtz, they discovered that the survey did not follow the 
river as the boundary between Lots 12 and 13 on one the hand, and 
Lots 5, 6 and 7 on the other. Indeed the re-survey showed that 
the Santa Clara River runs through Lots 12 and 13 and Lots 6 and 7 
do not abut the river at all. In addition, the re-survey showed 
that the homes on Lots 6 and 7 were actually situated astride the 
property boundaries. The home built by Karrs on Lot 7 and now 
occupied by the Zanes is actually partially on Lot 7 and partially 
on Lot 12. The home (mobile home with a permanent and fixed 
6. 
addition) placed by Myers and now occupied by McNeils, is partly 
on Lot 6, partly on Lot 12, and party on Lot 13. 
Cn May 2, 1989, the Englerts filed this suit alleging 
encroachment and praying for removal of the encroaching 
structures. The defense answered and counterclaimed asserting 
several affirmative defenses. 
The Plaintiffs testified that in their opinion the 
property north and west of the Santa Clara River had a value of 
fifty cents per square foot. They also testified that if the 
Defendants were allowed to take a portion of the property north 
and west of the Santa Clara River from Lots 12 and 13, any portion 
remaining on that side of the river would be reduced in value by 
one-half. On the other hand, Mr. Walter testified on the basis of 
his expertise regarding values in the subdivision and real 
property generally in that area of Washington County that land 
values have decreased about 20 per cent since the Plaintiffs 
bought Lots 12 and 13 from Mrs. Wirtz at a total price of 
$22,900.00 for both lots. That purchase price equates to 25 cents 
per square foot. 
ANALYSIS 
The Plaintiffs Complaint alleges encroachment by the 
Defendants. The law is settled that no person has the right to 
erect buildings or other structures upon his own land so that any 
7. 
part thereof will extend beyond his boundaries onto the land of an 
adjoining property owner. (1 Am Jur 2d, Section 118, page 769). 
The predecessors in interest of the defendants in this matter have 
clearly violated this rule of law. That does not however end our 
inquiry in the matter. 
The Plaintiffs herein seek the equitable remedy of 
ejectment of the Defendants. They wish to have the Court order 
the Defendants to remove the encroaching structures from Lots 12 
and 13. The Court is therefore constrained to consider the 
peculiar equities of this case to determine whether the Plaintiffs 
are entitled to this equitable relief. 
This case presents some unusual circumstances. It 
appears that the subdivider of the property and all those who 
bought in the subdivision up to the Plaintiffs simply assumed that 
the river constituted the boundary line between the various pieces 
of property. The subdivider so informed all of those to whom he 
sold pieces of property. In addition, the subdivider included 
language in the deeds to Lots 5, 6, 7 and 13 which he intended to 
assure that the property line would remain the center line of the 
river. 
It also appears that if the encroaching structures are 
moved they would be destroyed, or severely damaged and that those 
structures are valued at $80,000.00 to $85,000.00 each. These 
8. 
structures appear to have been in place for less than 20 years in 
the case of the McNeils and over 20 years in the case of the Zanes 
prior to the filing of this lawsuit. In addition, the survey plat 
which established the actual property boundaries has been a matter 
of public record in the VZashington County Recorder's office for 
over 24 years prior to the filing of the lawsuit. 
There is no evidence before this Court that prior to 
these Plaintiffs, anyone ever complained about the location of the 
boundaries or questioned the location of the Defendants' homes. 
All previous owners in the subdivision have assumed that the 
boundary was the center line of the river, although a- routine 
survey would have shown the discrepency. 
As the subdivision was actually laid out the river would 
run through Lots 12 and 13 and divide those lots. That would 
leave small parcels of Lots 12 and 13 to the north and west of the 
river which would not be suitable for construction of residences 
and which would not be accessable from the main portion of those 
lots without construction of a bridge at considerable expense in 
view of the fact that the river often rises dramatically during 
the runoff season. 
The Plaintiffs have not undertaken construction of 
improvements on Lots 12 and 13 and there remains on the southeast 
side of the river sufficient area for the Plaintiffs to construct 
9. 
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a residence as they testified they desired to do. Both the 
Plaintiffs' and the Defendants' predecessors in interest purchased 
their lots with the clear understanding that the center line of 
the river was the boundary. The subdivider and the County Tax 
Assessor also have believed that such was the case and and have so 
represented the situation to the property owners. The Plaintiffs 
were aware of the boundary dispute when they purchased Lots 12 and 
13. 
In weighing these equities the Court is convinced that 
requiring removal of the encroaching structures would not do 
equity. The persons now possessing the residences did not 
construct them, and did not know that they were encroaching on 
adjoining properties at the time that they purchased the 
property. In addition, there is no evidence that the predecessors 
in interest of these Plaintiffs ever raised an objection to the 
construction of the encroaching structures and in fact it appears 
that those predecessors bought their land with the understanding 
that their land only extended to the center line of the river. 
The Court is of the opinion that the Plaintiffs have an 
adequate remedy at law since their loss can be compensated by 
assessment of damages in their favor if in fact they are entitled 
to any legal remedy at all. Assessing damages and allowing the 
encroachments to remain will not destroy or significantly hinder 
the intended use and enjoyment of the property contemplated by the 
Plaintiffs. 
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The Court then turns to the question of whether or not 
the Plaintiffs are entitled to any remedy in face of the defenses 
raised by the Defendants. The Defendants have listed several 
defenses in their Answer but have not briefed or asserted all of 
them. The defenses which the Defendants have asserted are: 
1. Adverse possession; 
2. Statute of limitations; 
3. Boundary by acquiescence; 
4. Boundary by agreement; 
5. Prescriptive easement (profit a prendre). 
The Court will address those defenses seriatum. 
ADVERSE POSSESSION 
The Defendants attempted to show through testimony of 
the Washington County Assessor and his subordinates that they had 
paid taxes for more than seven years on those portions of Lots 12 
and 13 north and west of the river. The evidence did not support 
their contention. It is clear that the tax assessment was based 
on the lots as shown on the public record. The assessor did not 
check the survey and was not aware that parts of Lots 12 and 13 
were located north and west of the river. The assessor made no 
adjustment to the taxes for any of the lots on the basis that the 
McNeils and the Zanes and their predecessors were occupying land 
in Lots 12 and 13. In short, there was no evidence presented 
which would allow this Court to find that the owners of Lots 6 and 
7 ever paid taxes on any portion of Lots 12 and 13. 
11. 
Adverse possession has been codified in Utah, Section 
78-12-12 U.C.A., 1953 as Amended, clearly provides that title by 
adverse possession cannot be acquired without payment of ". . . 
all taxes which have been levied and assessed upon such land 
according to law". The defense of adverse possession must fail 
since there is no showing that the owners of Lots 5 and 7 ever 
paid any taxes on any portions of Lots 12 and 13. 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
The Defendants did not press this defense except to 
briefly mention it as it relates to their claim of adverse 
possession. Since the adverse possession defense has failed it 
follows that this defense must also fail. In addition, Section 
78-12-6 U.C.A. is inapplicable since the Defendants were "seized" 
(legal title holders) of the disputed property within 7 years of 
filing the suit. 
BOUNDAPY BY ACQUIESCENCE 
The Utah Supreme Court has recently addressed Boundary 
by Acquiescence on several occasions. The most recent cases 
re-establish four elements to be proven by the proponent: 
1. Occupation up to a visibile line marked by 
monuments, fences or buildings; 
2. Mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary; 
3. For a long period of time; 
4. By adjoining land owners. 
(See Judd Family Limited Partnership v. Hutchings, 
141 U.A.P. 8; Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P. 2d 417). 
12. ICO 
A review of the cases decided in Utah does not reveal 
whether a river constitutes a sufficient monument of a boundary to 
establish the above elements. Other authorities have held, 
however, that a river may be a sufficient monument to mark a 
"When relating to land, a monument is some 
tangible landmark established to indicate a 
boundary. Objects, to be ranked as monuments, 
have been required to have certain physical 
properties such as visibility, permanence 
and stability, and definite location, 
independent of measurements. Monuments are 
of two kinds, natural and artificial. . ." 
(See 11 C.J.S. Boundaries,Section 5, page 545). 
"Natural monuments are objects permanent in 
character which are found on the land as they 
were placed by nature, such as . . . streams 
and rivers." 
(See 11 C.J.S. Boundaries, Section 6, page 546 
and footnote 88, same page.) 
[See also Ellery v. Pacific Lumber Co., 281 
P. 428 (Cal.); Drake v. Russian River Land Co.; 
103 P. 167 (Cal.); Goodson v. Fitzgerald, 
90 S.W. 898 (Texas) ] 
Under the facts of this case this Court finds that the 
Santa Clara River is a sufficient boundary monument. It is clear 
from the testimony of the subdivider that each lot owner who 
purchased in the subdivision was told that the river was in fact 
the boundary. There is no evidence that the river has moved. The 
13. 
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river is certainly visible, permanent and stable, and has a 
definite location. 
The evidence clearly shows that the Defendants and their 
predecessors in interest have occupied those portions of Lots 12 
and 13 north and west of the river and abutting Lots 6 and 7 as 
though the river were the boundary. 
The next element is mutual acquiescence in the river as 
a boundary. 
The Court finds that no one ever questioned the river 
being the boundary until 1988. It appears that everyone living in 
the subdivision assumed that the river was the boundary and 
conducted themselves accordingly. The prior owners of Lots 12 and 
13 never disputed the Defendants1 occupation of the now disputed 
portions of Lots 12 and 13 prior to these Plaintiffs, for a period 
of some 23 years after the subdivision was created. The doctrine 
of boundary by acquiescence does not require an agreement between 
adjoining landowners to establish a particular monument as a 
boundary. Rather it requires only that the adjoining owners treat 
the monument as a boundary for the required time period. This is 
more akin to a prescriptive right than a contractual right. [See 
Law of Practical Location of Boundaries and the Need for an 
Adverse Possession Remedy, Brigham Young University Law Review, 
14. 
1986, by James H. Backman, hereinafter B.Y.U. L.R. 1986.1 This 
doctrine is founded on the policy ennunciated by the Supreme Court 
when it said, 
" . . . that the peace and good order of 
society require that there be stability 
. . . in the ownership and occupation of 
lands . . . [B]oundary lines which have 
been long established and accepted by 
those who should be concerned should be 
left undisturbed in order to leave at rest 
matters which may have resulted in 
controversy and litigation . . ." 
[Olsen v. Park Daughters Investment Co., 
511 P. 2d 145, 147 (1973) ] 
It is not necessary that the boundary was established by 
the parties, or their predecessors in interest as a result of a 
dispute or uncertainty. [Staker v. Ainsworth, supra.] 
It appears therefore that the owners of Lots 12 and 13 
on one side and Lots 6 and 7 on the other did acquiesce in the 
river being the boundary line. 
With regard to the third element, "for a long period of 
time", the Supreme Court has ruled in the case of Hobson v. 
Panguitch Lake Corporation, 530 P. 2d, 792, page 795, as follows: 
"But the opinion reaffirms the view that there 
must be some substantial long period of time 
and states that it is generally related to the 
common-law prescriptive easement period of 
20 years; and only under unusual circumstances 
would a lesser period be deemed sufficient." 
15, 
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It is clear that acquiescence in the boundary by 
adjoining property owners must span at least 20 years absent 
unusual circumstances. In the case of the Zanes, whose original 
predecessors in interest were the Karrs, it is clear that the time 
requirements for boundary by acquiescence have been met. In the 
case of the McNeils, who traced their interests to the original 
purchasers, the Myers, there is some question as to the length of 
time that the acquiescence has been ongoing. The evidence is 
clear with regard to Lot 7 that it has been occupied by the Zanes 
or their predecessors in interest at least since early 1968, as 
has that portion of Lot 12 north and west of the Santa Clara River. 
However, the evidence does not establish when Lot 6 and 
the portions of Lots 12 and 13, which are north and west of the 
river and abut Lot 6, were occupied by the McNeils1 predecessors 
in interest. The McNeils have failed to carry their burden of 
proof on that point. This Court must find, therefore, that 
although the McNeils are now occupying up the the river's edge and 
have been doing so for a considerable period, there is 
insufficient evidence to establish that they have been doing so 
for at least 20 years. 
Therefore, the third element of boundary by acquiescence 
has been shown as to defendants Zane but not as to defendants 
McNeil. 
16. 
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The fourth element, "by adjoining landowners" is obvious 
and has been established. 
The Court therefore finds that defendants Zane are 
entitled to a judgment quieting title in them to that parcel 
identified as parcel A on Plaintiff's Exhibit #3 under the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. Defendants McNeil are not 
so entitled. 
BOUNDARY BY AGREEMENT 
Boundary by Agreement requires: 
1. An agreement, 
2. between adjoining landowners. 
3. Settling a boundary that was uncertain or 
in dispute, 
4. executed by actual location of a boundary 
line, 
5. mutual acquiescence for a long period of 
time. 
(See Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P. 2d 417, footnote 4, 
page 423; B.Y.U. L.R. 1936, page 963.) 
Boundary by Agreement is premised on a contract theory. 
The rationale is that the parties, discovering that they had an 
uncertain or disputed boundary, would get together and settle the 
matter by agreement, locate an actual boundary line between them, 
and mutually honor that boundary for a long period of time (20 
years or more). The facts in this case do not support boundary by 
agreement. Until the 1988 survey commissioned by the Plaintiffs 
17. 
herein none of the lot owners was aware that there was an 
uncertainty or dispute as to the boundary line. Thereafter there 
was never any agreement establishing a boundary line. Boundary by 
agreement does not apply under these facts. 
PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT (Profit a Prendre) 
In the Utah Supreme Court case of Anderson v. 
Osguthorpe, 504 P. 2d 1000 (1972), Justice Ellott discussed the 
establishment of a prescriptive easement in the nature of profit a 
prendre. It appears that the elements which must be shown by the 
proponent of such an easement are as follows: 
1. Exclusive use of the disputed land 
2. for over 20 years 
3. with use thereof being open and notorious, 
continuous, uninterrupted, adverse, and 
under claim of right. 
This Court finds from the evidence that the Zanes have 
met the requirements to establish a prescriptive easement over the 
disputed portions of Lot 12. The evidence clearly demonstrates 
that the Defendants Zane and their predecessors in interest 
exercised exclusive use of the property upon which their home is 
situated and behind that home up to the edge of the river from the 
time that they purchased the property and took possession of it, a 
period of over 20 years. It is likewise clear from the facts that 
18. 
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the use of the property by the Defendants Zane herein was open and 
notorious, continuous, uninterrupted, adverse and under claim of 
right, versus the owners of Lot 12 and was under a claim of right 
based on the representations made to the original buyers by the 
subdivider. 
However, for the reasons set out hereinabove in 
analyzing boundary by acquiescence, this Court finds that the 
Defendants McNeil have failed to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that their use of the disputed portions of Lots 12 and 13 
abutting Lot 6 has continued for the required 20 years. Therefore 
that use has not ripened into a prescriptive easement. 
This Court therefore finds that if the Defendants Zane 
had not acquired title to the property under the doctrine of 
boundary of acquiescence they would have acquired a prescriptive 
easement to use the property as it is now being used and has been 
used historically. In view of such a right to use the property 
the Plaintiffs herein are entitled to no award of damages against 
Defendants Zane. 
The Defendants McNeil are not entitled to a prescriptive 
easement. 
ESTOPPEL 
Defendants raised estoppel as an affirmative defense in 
their Answer but did not assert that defense during trial. For 
purposes of resolving all possible legal issues, however, the 
Court will discuss estoppel as it applies to this case. 
19. 
The elements of boundary by estoppel are: 
1. Representations by the true owner that 
the mutually accepted line is the 
true boundary; 
2. reasonable reliance by the neighbor on 
those representations; 
3. substantial costs detrimentally incurred 
by the neighbor, and 
4. true owner knows that his representations 
are erroneous or was grossly negligent 
in making the representations. 
(See 8.Y.U. E.R. 1986, page 968) 
In the case before this Court it appears that all the 
elements are met except the last. There is no evidence that the 
original owner, Mr. Walter, knew that the river was not the 
boundary. Likewise, there is no evidence he was grossly negligent 
in making that representation to his buyers in view of his 
instructions to the surveyor and the appearance of the B.S.K.S. 
plat map with the boundary line seeming to track the river. 
Boundary by estoppel in not made out. 
DAMAGES 
The Court now turns to the issue of damages to be 
assessed against Defendants McNeil for their wrongful encroachment 
on Lots 12 and 13 and their wrongful possession and use of parcels 
B & C as shown on Plaintiff's Exhibit 3. 
Upon stipulation, the parties agreed that parcel B 
contains 5,401.84 square feet and parcel C contains 7,396.42 
square feet. The total of those parcels is therefore 12,798.26 
square feet, which the Court will round down to 12,798.00. 
20. 
Plaintiffs purchased Lots 12 and 13 together at a total cost of 
£22,900.00, or about 25 cents per square foot. Plaintiffs contend 
that the property has doubled in value and cite as proof certain 
"comparable sales" in the area. The Court can accord no weight to 
those "comparable sales" since Plaintiffs candidly admitted they 
had never seen those properties and had no idea how they actually 
compared to the property in dispute, including whether they had 
been improved. 
On the other hand Defendants offered the testimony of 
Mr. Walter who opined that the value of B.S.H.S. property has 
declined 20 percent since the Plaintiffs purchase in 1988. No 
supporting evidence was offered for Mr. Walter's opinion. 
The Court finds that the best indicator of the value of 
the property is the amount Plaintiff's paid when they purchased in 
1988, or 25 cents per square foot. 
SUMMARY 
Plaintiffs are therefore awarded judgment against 
Defendants McNeil in the amount of $3,199.50 plus interest at 10% 
from May 2, 1989 to date of trial, October 26, 1990, plus costs 
and interest on the entire judgment at 12% per annum simple 
interest from October 26, 1990, until paid in full. Title to the 
portions of Lots 12 and 13 designated as parcels B and C is then 
awarded to Defendants McNeil. 
21. 
Defendants Zane are awarded title to that portion of Lot 
12 designated as parcel A* No damages are assessed. 
Mo attorney fees are awarded to either side. Counsel 
for Plaintiffs is to prepare an appropriate Judgment. 
DATED this / ~" day of November, 1990. 
.fth District Judge 
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hand-delivered, to: 
Phillip L. Forecaster, Esq. Michael D. Hughes, Esq. 
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Gary W. Pendleton, Esq. 
150 North 200 East, Suite #202 
St. George, UT 84770 
(lafolfu )AmMAmQjAj 
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CLEKl^ J-,, 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAt DISTRICT, 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES C. ENGLERT and JO ANN 
ENGLERT, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
HENRY E 
G. ZANE 
JOHN A 
. ZANE and DOROTHY 
, husband and wife; 
McNEIL and KATHIE 
McNEIL, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
and 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW 
Civil No. 890502581 
This matter coming on for trial on October 24 and October 26, 
1990 before the Court sitting without a jury and the Plaintiffs being 
present and being represented by their attorney Phillip L. Foremaster 
and the Defendants being present and being represented by their attorney 
Michael D. Hughes and the Third-Party Defendant being present and 
being represented by his attorney Gary W. Pendleton and during the 
course of the trial a stipulation and agreement having been made 
between the Third-Party Plaintiffs and the Third-Party Defendant 
and he having been thereupon dismissed from the lawsuit and the 
remaining parties having presented testimony and evidence in support 
of their respective positions and the Court being fully advised in 
the premises now finds as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
A . TSrait i-Ti tkfe TsAA-VJfcVs ?casBB\\ and ? ^ T 1 C " I WtJJv&z wn&L 
a tract of land north of the town of Veyo in Washington County, Utah 
2B 
and created thereon a subdivision known under the name and style 
of Brookside Summer Homes Subdivision (B.S.H.S.). The subject 
property was surveyed by one Jack R. Newville, a registered land 
surveyor and professional engineer and the B.S.H.S. subdivision plat 
was approved and recorded in the Office of the Washington County, 
Utah recorder in mid-1965. Thereafter the subdivision lots were 
solde to various buyers, primarily by Russell Walter. 
2. Since the recording of the B.S.H.S. Subdivision Plat the 
Washington County, Utah Assessor has assessed taxes on the subdivided 
lots on the basis of the information contained on the recorded 
subdivision plat. 
3. Prior to the survey Mr. Walter instructed Mr. Newville that 
he should lay out the subdivision, insofar as possible, to make the 
Santa Clara River, which traverses the property, the common 
boundary between the lots on each side. It was Mr. Walter's intention 
and design that the lots on both sides of the river have title to 
the center line of the river. After the subdivision map was completed, 
it appeared that Mr. Walter's instructions had been followed as there 
was a meandering border down the center of the subdivision which 
Mr. Walter, and everyone else, assumed followed the course of the 
river. The location of the river did not appear on the subdivision 
plat. There was not attempt to check on the assumption regarding 
the river border until 1988 when the Plaintiffs in this case comm-
issioned a survey of Lots 12 and 13 in preparation for the purchase 
thereof. The survey revealed that the river was not on the boundary 
line between those lots and Lots 5, 6 and 7 which adjoin Lots 12 
and 13 on the Northwest. ^ 
4. As Mr. Walter sold the lots in his subdivision to various 
buyers he informed each buyer whose lots appeared to abut the river 
that they were in fact acquiring title to the center line of the 
river and nothing on the other side of the river. This was based 
upon Mr. Walter's assumption that his instructions to Mr. Newville 
had been followed. Mr. Walter also inserted in all but two deeds 
issued in the B.S.H.S. Subdivision a reservation which he intended 
to act as a guarantee that even if the course of the river changed 
the boundary line between the lots would change with it. The 
language of the reservation conveyed the property ffless any part 
crossing the Santa Clara River11. This language was contained in 
the deed issued to the first purchaser of Lot 13 and to several others 
thereafter but was not included in the chain of deeds to the pur-
chasers of Lot 12. 
5. The Court finds that the reservation in the deeds was based 
on the presumption set forth in paragraph four above, which presump-
tion was a mistake; as such, the reservation is ineffective and a 
nullity. 
6. In the first year or so after the subdivision was recorded, 
Mr. Walter sold Lot 7 to Mr. and Mrs. Karr on a Real Estate Contract. 
The Karrs immediately took possession and began building a house 
on the lot which was completed by the end of 1967 or the beginning 
of 1968. In 1969, after the real estate contract was paid off, Mr. 
Walter recorded a Warranty Deed transferring title from the Lucky 
7 Rodeo Corporation to the Karrs. The Karrs were told at the time 
that they purchased the property that they owned the land up to the 
center of the river and were actually taken to the property and shown 
survey stakes by Mr. Walter which he said evidenced that boundary. 
The Karrs purchased the property after receiving those representations, 
Immediately after signing the real estate contract the Karrs began 
using the land to the riverfs edge for various recreational pursuits, 
as a back yard, for access to the river and for the maintenance of 
landscaping such as grasses and trees. Some of the plants in the 2 
area were natural and some imported and planted by the Karrs. The 
area was kept groomed to the water's edge. Mr. Walter observed this 
use and testified that it continued for several years after the Karrs 
took possession. 
7. Within a short time after the Karrs bought Lot 7, Mr. and 
Mrs. Glenn Myers bought Lot 6, also on a land sales agreement. They 
also took possession of the property immediately and placed a mobile 
home thereon. The exact date that they purchased the property or 
took possession was not established by the evidence but the Karrs 
and the Myers were mong the first purchasers in the subdivision. 
Title to Lot 6 was transferred by warranty deed to the Myers in 1972 
after the ypaid off their land sales contract. The county tax records 
indicate a mobile home first appeared on the property in the 1970 
assessment. The Myers were also told by Mr. Walter when they purchased 
that their land extended to the center line of the river. Sometime 
after their purchase of the land, the Myers began using the property 
to the water's edge much in the same way as the Karrs were doing. 
8. The Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that 
Lots 6 and 7 were used much in the same fashion through various owners 
thereafter to the present title holders, Mr. and Mrs. Zane on Lot 
7 and Mr. and Mrs. McNeil on Lot 6, the testimony of Mr. Santa Maria 
notwithstanding. The Court's onsight inspection revealed that both 
the Zanes and the McNeils continue to use the land in teh same ways 
as did their predecessors. 
9. The Washington county Assessor assumed that the river was 
the boundary between Lots 5,6 and 7 on the one side and Lots 12 and 
13 on the other but the taxes were assessed not on the locaton of 
the river but on the location of the property lines as shown on the 
subdivison plat recorded in the County Recorder's Office. The Court 
finds that no taxes for Lots 12 and 13 were ever paid by the owners 
of Lots 6 and 7. 2S^I 
10. When these Plaintiffs commissioned the 1988 re-survey of 
Lots 12 and 13, which lots they intended to acquire from one Dorothy 
Wirtz, they discovered that the survey did not follow the river as 
boundary between Lots 12 and 13 on the one hand, and Lots 5,6 and 
7 on the other. Indeed the re-survey showed that the Santa Clara 
River runs through Lots 12 and 13 and Lots 6 and 7 do not abut the 
river at all. In addition, the re-survey showed that the homes on 
Lots 6 and 7 were actually situated astride the property boundaries. 
The home built by the Karrs on Lot 7 and now occupied by the Zanes 
is actually partially on Lot 7 and partially on Lot 12. The home 
(mobile home with a permanent and fixed addition) placed by Myers 
and now occupied by McNeils, is partly on Lot 6, partly on Lot 12 
and partly on Lot 13. 
11. On May 2, 1989 the Englerts filed this suit alleging 
encroachment and praying for removal of the encroaching structures. 
The defense answered and counterclaimed asserting several affirmative 
defenses. 
12. The plaintiffs testified that in their opinion the property 
north and west of the Santa Clara River had a value of fifty cents 
per square foot. They also testified that if the defendants were 
allowed to take a portion of the property north and west of the Sana 
Clara River from Lots 12 and 13, any portion remaining on that side 
of the river would be reduced in value by one-half. On the other 
hand, Mr. Walter testified on the basis of his expertise regarding 
values in the subdivison and real property generally in that area 
of Washington County that land values have decreased about 20 per 
cent since the Plaintiffs bought Lots 12 and 13 from Mrs. Wirtz at 
a total price of $22,900.00 for both lots. That purchase price 
equates to 25 cents per square foot. 
13. The Plaintiff's complaint alleges encroachment by the 3 B 3 
Defendants. The law is settled that no person has the right to 
erect buildings or other structures upon his own land so that any 
part thereof will extend beyond his boundaries onto the land of an 
adjoining property owner. 
14. The Court finds that the predecessors in interst of the 
Defendants in this matter have clearly violated this rule. 
15. The Plaintiffs herein seek the equitable remedy of ejectment 
of the Defendant. They wish to have the Court order the Defendants 
to remove the encroaching structures from Lots 12 and 13. The Court 
is therefore constrained to consider the peculiar equities of this 
case to determine whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to this equitable 
relief. 
16. This case presents some unusual circumstances. It appears 
that the subdivider of the property and all those who. bought in the 
subdivision up to the Plaintiffs simply assumed that the river 
constituted the boundary line between the various pieces of property. 
The subdivider so informed all of those to whom he sold pieces of 
property. In addition, the subdivider included language in the deeds 
to Lots 5, 6,7 and 13 which he intended to assure that the property 
line would remain the center line of the river. 
17. It also appears that if the encroaching structures are 
moved they would be destroyed, or severely damaged and that those 
structures are valued at $80,000.00 to $85,000.00 each. These 
structures appear to have been in place for less than 20 years in 
the case of the McNeils and over 20 years in the case of the Zanes 
prior to the filing of this lawsuit. In addition, the survey plat 
which established the actual property boundaries has been a matter 
of public record in the Washington County Recorder's Office for over 
24 years prior to the filing of the lawsuit. r^*'^ 5 
18. There is no evidence before this Court that prior to these 
Plaintiffs anyone ever complained about the location of the bound-
aries or questioned the location of the Defendants1 homes. All 
previous owners in the subdivison have assumed that the boundary 
was the center line of the river, althougha routine survey would 
have shown the discrepency. 
19. As the subdivision was actually laid out the river would 
run through Lots 12 and 13 and divide those lots. That would leave 
small parcels of lots 12 and 13 to the north and west of the river 
which would not be suitable for construction of residences and which 
would not be accessable from the main portion of those lots without 
construction of a bridge at considerable expense in view of the fact 
that the river often rises dramatically during the runoff season. 
20. The Plaintiffs have not undertaken construction of impove-
ments on Lots 12 and 13 and there remains on the Southeast side of 
the river sufficient area for the Plaintiffs to construct a residence 
as they testified they desired to do. Both the Plaintiffs and the 
Defendants1 predecessors in interest purchased their lots with the 
clear understanding that the center line of the river was the bound-
ary. The subdivider and the County tax Assessor also have believed 
that such was the case and have so represented the situation to the 
property owners. The Plaintiffs were aware of the boundary dispute 
when the purchased Lots 12 and 13. 
21. In weighing these equities the Court is convinced that 
requiring the removal of the encroaching structures would not do 
equity. The persons now possession the residences did not construct 
them, and did not know that they were encroaching on adjoining 
properties at the time that they purchased the property. In addition, 
these is not evidence that the predecessors in interest of these 
Plaintiffs ever raised an objection to the construction of the en-
croaching structures and in fact it appears that those predecessors 
bought their land with the understanding that their land only extended 
to the center line of the river. 
22. The Court is of the opinion that the Plaintiffs have an 
adequate remedy at law since their loss can be compensated by 
assessment of damages in their favor. Assessing damages and allowing 
the encroachments to remain will not destroy or significantly hinder 
the intended use and enjoyment of the property contemplated by the 
Plaintiffs. 
23. There is no evidence before the Court that either the Def-
endants or their predecessors in interest ever paid any taxes on 
Lots 12 and 13 of the subject subdivision. Therefore Adverse 
Possession is not applicable. 
24. Under the facts of this case the Court finds that the 
Santa Clara River is a sufficient boundary monument for applicaiton 
of the doctrine of Boundary Line by Acquiescence. It is clear from 
the testimony of the subdivider that each lot owner who purchased 
in the subdivison was told that the river was in fact the boundary. 
There is not evidence that the river has moved. The river is certainly 
visible, permanent and stable, and has a definite location. 
25. The evidence clearly shows that the Defendants and their 
predecessors in interest have occupied those portions of Lots 12 
and 13 north and west of the river and abutting Lots 6 and 7 as thought 
the river were the boundary. 
26. The Court finds that no one ever questioned the river being 
the bvoundary until 1988. It appears that everyone living in the 
subdivison assumed that the river was the boundary and conducted 
themselves accordingly. The prior owners of Lots 12 and 13 never 
disputed the Defendants1 occupation of the now disputed portions 
of Lots 12 and 13 prior to these Plaintiffs, for a period of some 
23 years after the subdivision was created. The doctrine of boundary 
by acquiescence does not require an agreement between adjoining land-
owners to establish a particular monument as a boundary. Rather 
it requires only that the adjoining owners treat the monument as 
a boundary for the required time period. This is more akin to a 
prescriptive right than a contractual right. 
27. It appears therefore that the owners of Lots 12 and 13 
on one side and Lots 6 and 7 on the other did acquiesce in the river 
being the boundary line. 
28. It is clear that acquiescence in the boundary by adjoining 
property owners must span at least 20 years absent unusual circums-
tances. In the case of the Zanes, whose original predecessors in 
interest were the Karrs, it is clear that the time requirements for 
boundary by acquiescence have been met. In the case of the McNeils 
who traced their interests to the original purchasers., the Myers, 
there is some question as to the length of time that acquiescence 
has been ongoing. The evidence is clear with regard to Lot 7 that 
it has been occupied by the Zanes or their predecessors in interest 
at least since early 1968, as has that portion of Lot 12 north and 
west of the Santa Clara River. 
29. The Evidence does not establish when Lot 6 and the portions 
of Lots 12 and 13, which are north and west of the river and abut 
Lot 6, were occupied by the McNeils1 prececessors in interest. The 
Mcneils have failed to carry their burden of proof on that point. 
This Court must find, therefore, that although the McNeils are now 
occupying up to the river's edge and have been doing so for a cons-
iderable period, there is insufficient evidence to establish that 
they have been doing so for at least 20 years. r S * / 
30. The Defendants Zane are entitled to judgment of the Court 
quieting title in them under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
in and to the following described real property located in Washington 
County, State of Utah, to-wit: 
Beginning at the Southwest Corner of Lot 7, Brookside Summer Homes 
Subdivision and running thence South parallel with the East 
boundary line of lot 12 of said subdivison to the center of the Santa 
Clara River; thence easterly along the center line of the Santa Clara 
River to the East lot line of said Lot 12; thence Northerly along 
said east boundary line of said lot 12 to the Northeast corner of 
said Lot 12; thence Westerly along the Northerly Boundary Line of 
said Lot 12 to the point of beginning. 
31. The Defendants McNeil, having failed to establish a suffi-
cient length of holding for boundary line by acquiescence are not 
entitled to any order quieting title to them in any of the involved 
real property. 
32. The Defendants raised as a defense to the Plaintiffs1 
Complaint the defense of Boundary By Agreement however the Court 
finds no such agreement and therefore no merit in such defense. 
33. In addition to the aforesaid findings the Court finds that 
the Defendants Zane have showing sufficient evidence to establish 
a prescriptive easement in the above entitled real property however 
the Defendants McNeil have failed to meet their burden of proof to 
support such a claim. 
34. The Defendants McNeil have encroached upon the following 
described real property located in Washington County, Utah and 
belonging to the Plaintiffs said encroachment being wrongful, said 
property being described as follows: 
Beginning at the Southwest Corner of Lot 6, Brookside Summer Homes 
Subdivision and running Southerly parallel with the East boundary 
line of Lot 13 of said Subdivision to the center of the Santa Clara 
River; thence Easterly along the center line of the Santa Clara River 
to the East boundary line of said Lot 13; thence Northerly along 
the East boundary line of said lot 13 to the Northeast Corner of 
said Lot 13; thence Westerly along the North boundary line of said 
Lot 13 to the point of beginning. 
Beginning at the Southeast Corner of Lot 6, Brookside Summer Homes .~oC 
Subdivision and run thence Southerly parallel with the West 
boundry line of lot 12 of said subdivision to the center of the Santa 
Clark River; thence Westerly along the center line of said Santa 
Clara River to the West boundary line of said lot 12; thence Northerly 
along the West boundary line of said lot 12 to the Northwest Corner 
of said Lot 12; thence Easterly along the North boundary line of 
said Lot 12 to the point of beginning. 
35. As a result of said encroachment the Plaintiffs are 
entitled to be paid damages for the loss of their property because 
of such encroachment in the amount of 25 cents per square foot so 
taken which amount the Court finds as being the fair market value 
for said property so taken. 
36. That according to stipulat ion of the parties, the total 
square feet taken by said encroachments, described at trial as Parce 
B and C and referenced in Findings of Fact No. 34, supra, is 12,798 
square feet. That as a result the amount of damage is 25 cents 
multiplied by 12,798 or $3199,50 plus interest at 10 per cent per 
annum from May 2, 1989 to date of trial of October 26, 1990 plus 
costs and interest on the entire judgment at 12 per cent per annum 
from October 26, 1990 until paid in full. 
37. That as soon as judgment is paid the Defendants McNeil 
are entitled to have awarded to them title to the property described 
in Finding numbesr 34 above. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
As Conclusions of Law from the foregoing Findins of Fact the 
Court concludes as follows: 
1. That the Defendants Zane are entitled to an order of this 
Court quieting title in them and against Plaintiffs to the real pro-
perty located in Washington County, Utah and particularly described 
in Finding number 30 above. 
2. That the Plaintiffs are entitled to Judgment against the 
Defendants McNeil in the principal sum of $3199.50 together with 
interest thereron from May 2, 1989 to October 26, 1990 plus costs 
and interest on the entire Judgment at 12 per cent per annum from 
October 26, 1990 until paid in full. 
3. That upon payment of said Judgment the Defendants McNeil 
are entitled to have awarded to them title to the property described 
in Finding number 3A above. 
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 
Dated this } D~ day of-Bay, 1991. 
district J^dge 
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CLchi 
DEPUTY S ^ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES C. ENGLERT and JO ANN 
ENGLERT, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
HENRY E. ZANE and DOROTHY 
G. ZANE, husband and wife; and 
JOHN A. McNEIL and KATHY 
McNEIL, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 890502581 
This matter coming on for trial on October 24 and October 26, 
1990 before the Court sitting without a jury and the Plaintiffs being 
present and being represented by their attorney Phillip L. Foremaster 
and the Defendants and Third-party Plaintiffs being represented by 
their attorney Michael D. Hughes and the Third Party Defendant being 
present and being represented by his attorney Gary W. Pendleton and 
during the course of the trial a stipulation and agreement havinf 
fcv been made between the Third-Party Plaintiffs and the Third-Party 
.y Defendants and said Third-party Defendant having been thereupon 
w 
Y dismissed from the lawsuit and the parties having presented certain 
testimony and exhibits and the Court having been fully advised in 
the premises and having caused to be entered its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and ordered judgment in accordance therewith; ,-. 
NOW THEREFORE, it.is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that 
title to the following described real property located in Washington 
County, State of Utah is hereby quieted in the Defendants Henry E. 
Zane and Dorothy G. Zane, husband and wife, and against the Plaintiffs, 
said real property being particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at the Southwest Corner of Lot 7, Brookside Summer Homes 
Subdivision and running thence South parallel with the East Boundary 
Line of Lot 12 of said subdivision to the center of the Santa Clara 
River; thence Easterly along the center line of the Santa Clara River 
to the East lot line of said Lot 12; thence Northerly along said 
East Boundary Line of said Lot 12 to the Northeast Corner of said 
Lot 12; thence Westerly along the Northerly Boundary Line of said 
Lot 12 to the point of beginning. 
It is further ORDERED that the Plaintiffs Charles C. Englert 
and Jo Ann Englert do have judgment against the Defendants John A. 
McNeil and Kathie McNeil, husband and wife in the principal sum of 
$3199.50 together with interest thereon at the rate of 10 per cent 
per annum from May 12, 1989 to October 26, 1990 in the amount of 
$466.91, making a total Judgment of $3666.41 together with costs 
and interest thereon at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from October 
26, 1990 until paid in full. 
It is further ORDERED that upon payment of said Judgment title 
to the following described real property located in Washington 
County, Utah shall be awarded to the Defendants John A. McNeil and 
Kathie McNeil, said property being described as follows: 
Beginning at the Southwest Corner of Lot 6, Brookside Summer Homes 
Subdivision and running thence parallel with the East Boundary Line 
of Lot 13 of said Subdivision to the center of the Santa Clara River; 
thence Easterly along the center line of the Santa Clara River to 
the East Boundary Line of said Lot 13; thence Northerly along the 
East boundary line of said Lot 13 to the Northeast Corner of said 
Lot 13; thence Westerly along the North Boundary Line of said Lot 
13 to the point of beginning. 
Beginning at the Southeast Corner of Lot 6, Brookside Summer Homes 
Subdivision and running thence Southerly parallel with the West 
Boundary Line of Lot 12 of said Subdivision to the center of the 
Santa Clara River; thence Westerly along the center line of said 
Santa Clara River to the West Boundary Line of said Lot 12; thence 
Northerly along the West Boundary Line of said Lot 12 to the Northwest 
Corner of said Lot 12; thence Easterly along the North Boundary Line 
of §aid Lot 12 to the point of beginning, 
Dated this /Oil day of *sS^1991. 
(J2AS&*~ 
Judge 
£?3 
